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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 3, Sheet 2
Cert to CA 10
(Seth, McWilliams, Barrett)

No. 77-1646
JONES (accident victim)

v.
FARMERS ALLIANCE (insurance co.)
1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petr challenges under Erie the decision of

the DC to permit resp to bring a declaratory judgment diversity
action, the failure of the DC to realign the nominal parties so as
to destroy diversity, and the ultimate decision to grant summary
judgment.
2.

There is nothing certworthy here.

FACTS:

In 1975, respondent issued a general automobile

insurance liability policy to the Spann Chevrolet Company providing

- 2 that respondent would insure against any liability arising from
automobile accidents in which the named insured, any officer of
the corporation or anyone using a car owned by Spann Chevrolet
with permission were involved.

In May 1976, a Camaro driven by

one Shippey, but owned by Spann Chevrolet was involved in an
accident.

Shippey was killed, Melissa Spann, and two other

passengers were injured.

Melissa Spann had been given permission

to use the vehicle, but apparently Shippey had not.
Subsequently, two of the passengers filed negligence in
state court naming Spann's estate as the defendant.

Prior to the

litigation of these actions, responaent filed a declaratory
judgment action in federal court naming Spann Chevrolet, Orval
Spann, Melissa Spann, Spann's estate and the other two passengers
as defendants.

(Respondent is a Kansas Corp. while all the

defendants reside in Oklahoma.)

The DC granted summary judgment

for respondent on the ground that no permission to operate the
vehicle had been given to Shippey and thus respondent would/could
not be liable under the insurance policy with Spann Chevrolet.
The two passengers appealed the decision alleging that the
DC had no jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, that
Orval Spann and Spann Chevrolet should have been realigned as
parties, and that summary judgment should not have been granted.
The CA affirmed.

It first rejected the claim that since under

Oklahoma law an insurance company cannot bring a declaratory
judgment action, under Erie it should not be allowed to bring such
an action in DC.

The CA held that the Declaratory Judgment Act

- 3 -

involves only procedural remedies not substantive rights, and
thus under Erie it is not necessary to look to state law.

Generally,

theCA found the DC's decision to allow declaratory relief to
be well within its discretion.

The CA also rejected the argument

that the parties should have been realigned so as to destroy
diversity.

Specifically, the CA looked to the pleadings and

determined that there did exist a dispute between Spann Chevrolet
and the respondent, in that Spann claimed that the insurance
company had an obligation to defend it in any negligence suit
that should arise out of the accident.

Finally, the CA agreed

that the granting of summary judgment was appropriate.

No evidence

was presented in the DC -- via affidavits or otherwise -- suggesting
any basis for infering that Shippey had even the implied permission
of Spann Chevrolet to drive the disputed vehicle.
DISCUSSION:

I doubt that this fact-specific diversity case

warrants any attention here. .
largely correct.
6/21/78
sl

The decision of the CA seems

I would deny.

There is a response.
Rosenfeld
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Summer List 1, Sheet 3
No. 77-1645
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE
ADVISORS, INC., ET AL.

Cert to CA 9 (East, SDJ,
Browning; Walla0e; dissents)

v.
LEWIS

Federal/Civil
I.

SU~WARY:

Timely

The question presented is whether a private right

of action may be implied under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
This is the same issue as was raised in Fleschner v. Abrahamson,
No. 77-1279, cert.
II. FACTS:

~ (!-iay

15, 1978).

Resps sued petrs (four corporate or trust entities

and five individual trustees of a mortage trust) in DC, asserting a

C4At. .
J
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.naiAVn 11

private right of action under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.
In a terse order, the DC dismissed the complaint, holding that the

I))M

1~
1'fl..

moft.

devt Iopme,fJ
I

t/,d

-2Act provided no basis for such an action.
III. HOLDING BELOW:

Writing for ,. himself and Judge Browning,

Senior District Judge East (of Charlestone Stone fame) reversed,
holding that a private right of action could be implied under the Act.
~ The

opinion contains no analysis; it merely cites with approval

the decisions of CA 2 and CA 5 in Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
568 F.2d 862 (CA 2 1977), and Wilson v. First Houston Investme nt
Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (CA 5 1978).
Judge Wallace dissented in an opinion which also contained

o~-~d~ Gurf~

no analysis; he cited with approval
in Abrahamson, supra,
IV. CONTENTIONS:

and

nothin~

more.

Petrs contend that there is no private right

of action under the Act.

Their analysis is succinct: ''Rather

than repeat the reasons why a writ should issue here, we respectful ly
refer the Court to the petition for certiorari filed in Abrahamson,
and specifically to pages 7-15."
Resp notes that certiorari was denied in Abrahamson on May 15,
1978.
V. DISCUSSION:

For a discussion of the issues underlying

petrs' claim, see the pool memo for Abrahamson.

Since the Court

was not interested in considering that one, I would not think that
cert should be granted here.

There is a response.
6-14-78
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

October 26, 1978

Re:

Nos. 77-1645 and 77-1717, Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis; and
First Houston Invetment Corp. v. Wilson

Dear Lewis,
Please add my name to your dissenting
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u:prtmt

Q}tturl ttf tift ~t~ ~tatts
jj'uftittgLm. ~. <!}. 2llP:'1~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

October 12, 1978

Re:

Nos. 77-1645 and 77-1717 Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors (TAMA) v. Lewis; and First Houston
Investment Corp. v. Wilson

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissent in this case.

Sincerely,,_/

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT 'OF ',fHE UNITED STATES
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC.
(TAMA) .ET AL. v. HARRY LEWIS
ON PETITION fOU WRIT Of CJ!:R'l'IORARI TO THE UNITED S'I'ATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THI<J NINTH CIRCUIT

FIRST HOUSTON INVESTMENT CORP. ET AL. v.
JOHN M . WILSON
QN PETI'l'ION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORAlU TO TfiE UNITED STATES
CQU:fl.T OF APPEALS FO!;t TlfE fiFTH CIRCUI'r
Nos. 77-1645 m1d 77-ln7. Decided October-, 1978

MR. JusTICE Po'fELL, dissenting.
These cases present the question whether § 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Act), 15 U.S. C.§ 80b-6,
giv;' ";)uSt'om~serring fraud a private cause of action
against a.n investment company f!Ud its aqviser. As it did last
Term in fi'leschner v. Abraharnsor1,- U. S. - , 46 U. S. L. W.
3710 (May 15, 1978) , the Court today declines an opportunity
to decide this quest~on. The Act contains no provision authorizing private suits. · and whether authority to sue may be
inferred has caused sharp disagreement withi11 the courts of
appeals. ·
The respondellt in No. 77-1645 is a sha.r~hqlder of the
Mortgage Trust of Americlt ( MT A) , a re~tl estate investment tru('lt under l. R. C. §~ 856-858. He brought suit
against MTA aqd various companies and individuals associated with MTA (the petitioners), alleging that t~e petitioners
had participated in a fraud~lent scheme under which ·MTA
was organized and operated to the advantage of its adviser and
parent ~tnd to the detriment of MTA's iuvestors. Each qf the
complaint's six Cll.USes of action purported to be based on § 206
of the Act, which m~kes it illegal for an mvestment adviser
covered by the Act to "e!1gage in any transaction, practice; or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon

0 l1
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any client or prospective client." Jurisdiction was invoked
under ~ 214 of the' Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-14, which gives
federal courts jurisdiction "of violations of this subchapter or
the rules, regulBrtions, or orders thereunder, and ... of all sqits
in equity to enjoiq a.ny violation of this sqbchapter . . . ."
The District Court for the Northeru District of California
dismissed the respondeut's suit. ruling that ~ 206 of the Act
does not afford investors such ::ts the respondent a private
cause of action against a.n in~estment company. The Court
of Appeals for the Kinth Circuit reversed, stating simply that
it h~d reviewed the question and agreed wit}:l th~ Second and
Fifth Circuits that § 206 gives rise to a private cause of action.
See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 86:2 ·( 1977), cert.
denied, ·- 1J. S. - , 46 U. S. L. W. 3710 (May 15, 1978);
Wilsou \', First Houston Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235
(CA5 1978). cert. dellled this day. No. 77-1717. One judge
dissented from the court's decision, stating that he also had
reviewed the question and sided with th~ dissent in
A braham son.
The respondent in No. 77- 1717 is an individual who entrusted his stock portfolio, worth $104.358. to the m'a nagement
of the petitioners (First Houston Investment Company and
thre<> of its employees). Within 18 months, First Houston
had transformed the portfolio through extensive trading into
a list of stocks worth slightly over $5.000. The respondent
brought suit against the petitioners asserting, inter alia, that
they had violated ~ 206 of the Act by 1nisrepresenting First
Houston 's 'nwthod of operations.
The District Court for the Western District of Texas
dismissed the respondent's claim under ~ 206. hut the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. After examining the
requirements this Court ha,s set down for implying private
causes of action, see Piper v. Chri.<J-Craft 1tldustries, Inc., 430'
U. S. 1 (1 977) . the court concluded that § 206 gives rise to a
private action for damages. ln so ruling, the court relied
heavily upon the Second Circuit's opinion in Abrahamson v.
lj''l'esdmeJ', One rn€mber. oi the panel dissented from the Fifth

TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC. v. LEWIS
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Circuit's ruling, arguing that the ·purpose of the Act was to
allow Congress to gather the information necessa,ry for it to
decide whether it should legislate further concerniug abuses of
ipvestment companies. Tl1Us, the dissent concluded that § 206
was not meant to provtde a private cause of action for individ~
ual investors.
Recent decisions of this Court have re9..ffirmed tha.t private
causes of actiqn will be il1ferred from securities statutes only
if such an inference is consistent with the language and history
of the statute a:qd is necessary to avoid subversion of Congress'
purpose in passing the statute. See, e. g., Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977). If cpurts are to avo.id
stepping beyond the legislative bounda.ries set by Congress,
they must take care in extending damage liability under
statutes that do not create such liability explicitly. In the
words of Justice Frankfurter, "[a]t best this is Sl.lbtle business,
calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere
rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of
legislation bec~mes legislation itself." Palmer v. M assachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 83 (1!=139). This danger i~S particularly
act.lte with respect to § 206 of the Act, as Congress has
declined to proyide for priva.t e d!lmage a.ctions, 'although it
severa.l times hf:ls reviewed and otherwise strengthened the
enforcement me~hanisrps of the Apt. See the opinion of Judge
Gurfein, concu'r riug ancl dissenting in Abrahdmson v. Flesch'f!.er,
568 F. 2d 862, 883-884 (CA2 1977), an opi~ion that I find
quite persuasive.
Moreover, tt~e jurisdictio11al grant of the Act differs from
tha,t of other securities acts in its reference only to "suits in
equity"; other acts include as well a grant of jurisdiction
extending to "actions at law brought to enforce any lia.bility
or duty created [under the A.ct] ." Compare § 214 of the Act
with § 44 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. 8. C.
§' 80a-43.
·
Three Courts pf Appeals npw have oonsidered whether § 206
of the Act creates a private action for da~ages against investment companies. In each case, the panel has been sha.rply

4
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divided in its resolution of the question, individual members
having drawn different inferences from the l~tnguag'e and legislative history of the Act. furthermore, the liability of invest'
ment companies to private damage suits
under the Act is a
matter of considerable importance both to the companies and
to the public Wlth whom they deaL
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~TA-M A

J ~~~9RANDUM

~/

To:

Justice Powell

Re:

TAMA v. Lewis--No. 77-1645, and First Houston v. Wilson--

(~~~~

No. 77-1717
At your request I have reviewed

t~t~in~
A'./~~

~ LA-/ ~

to determine whether certiorari shoul ~~ anted 1n both and

~~

the cases heard together, or one should be held for the
decision in the other.

As the question presented here is

solely one of the proper interpretation of §206 of the
Investment Advisers Act, the development of the record largely
in inconsequential for the Court's purposes.

Nevertheless,

there are two factors that the Court should take into account
in deciding how to review these cases.
1.

The Court of Appeals' opinions in

~irst

Houston, No.

77-1717, are much more discursive and informative than those in
TAMA, No. 77-1645.

As we noted in our dissent to the denial of

certiorari, in the latter case the Court of Appeals merely
stated their agreement or disagreement with Abrahamson v.
Fleschner.
2.

More important, however, in First Houston there is a

~~- ~~~~ iss~: presented in the certiorari petition that could
present the

tourt

with difficulties.

~o1~~<1
te1

Thus, it appears that the

plaintiff's original complaint charged violations of both the
Investment Advisers Act and §10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.

Upon motion of the defendants, the district court

dismissed both parts of the complaint, but gave the plaintiff
leave to amend the §10(b) allegations.

Plaintiff amended the

§10(b) charge, but the amended complaint made no mention of the
Investment Advisers Act.

.----------defendants judgment on
appealed.

The district court then gave the

the pleadings, and the plaintiff

Plaintiff's notice of appeal from this ruling made

no mention of the original dismissal of the Investment Advisers
Act claim.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that it had

jurisdiction to review both claims.

In so doing, the court

admitted that it was going contrary to a ruling of the ninth
circuit.

See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967).

Petitioner has presented this ruling of the Court of
Appeals for review in addition to the Investment Advisers Act
issue.

Unless the Court wants to decide both questions,

therefore, it should grant certiorari

in~'

No. 77-1645

alone, and hold First Houston, No. 77-1717 for the decision in

---

TAMA.
11/3/78
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Clerk

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 20, 1979

77-1645 TransAmerica Mortage v. Lewis
This case (cert to CA9), which I urqed the Court
to grant, presents the following questions:
"May a private right of action at law for damages
be implied under §214 of the Investment Advisers
Act?"
As I have read the briefs, and am dictating this
memo in my apartment on the day of the "great snow", I do
not have my file or access to the books.

The purpose of the

memo will he to identify - briefly and incompletely - the
arguments of the parties, and the point or points that I
would like my clerk particularly to address.
Courts of appeals in CA2 (Abrahamson v. Fleschner)
and CAS (Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp.) had
answered this question in the affirmative prior to CA9's
consideration of this case.

CA9 agreed, adopting in effect

the majority opinions in Fleschner and Wilson.

Judge

Wallace dissented, adopting Judge Gurfein's dissent in
Fleschner.

Several district courts have agreed with the

courts of appeals.

I am not aware of any decision to the

contrary.
I voted to grant primarily because of my tentative
agreement with Judge Gurfein's dissent in Fleschner.
Although the SEC's amicus brief attacks Gurfein's opinion
with vigor, and may score some points against it, I continue

2.

to lean toward the Gurfein view.
The parties seem to agree that the four-point
of Cort v. Ash is

Not

differ in its app lication.
The second Cort factor is whether there "[is]
indication of legislative intent explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or deny one?"

Of the four

Cort factors this seems to me the most important in this
case because both the language and

------

siqnificant and consistent support

--------~--'-----'--------------------------------the
question presented.
-~

S~ction

214 of the Advisers Act confers

jurisdiction on state and federal courts "of all suits in
equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the
rules, regulations, or orders thereunder".

It does not

confer jurisdiction over "actions at law".

This distinction

is siqnificant in view of the fact that the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940 all
provide that District Courts shall have jurisdiction of "all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by" those acts.

The Advisers Act

and the Investment Company Act were introduced in Congress
at the same time, and are considered as companion
legislation.
SEC's early draft of the Advisers Act

3.

incorporated a provision - similar' to that in the Investment
Company Act conferring jurisdiction over "actions at law".
But this was omitted from the final draft enacted by
Congress, although the record is not entirely clear as to
why this occurred.

Petitioner's brief argues that it was

the result of a compromise between supporters and opponents
of the legislation.
See Judge Gurfein's opinion, addressing the
significance of the difference in language between these
related securities statutes.

568 F.2d, at 881.

Petitioner's brief also points out that Congress
had opportunities to include "actions at law" in 1960, 1970
and 1978 - when amendments to the Advisers Act either were
adopteo by Congress or considered by it, and no change was
made in the original language.

Indeed, in 1976, the SEC

proposed an amendment that would have expressly conferred
jurisdiction over "actions at law".

Although the bill was

referred out by the Senate Committee, it did not come to a
vote.
The 1976 amendments were reintroduced by the SEC
in January 1977, but no hearings were held on the bill.

I

do not know whether these amendments have again been
introduced in the new Congress.

My clerk should check this.

Respondents and the SF.C's lengthy amicus brief
devote major efforts to explain away what seems, certainly

·~----------------------------·~--~"·~--------------------~--------------~---L--~

4.

upon first consideration, to be rather conclusive evidence
that Congress had never intended to authorize private
actions for damages.

The SG's brief, apparently written

Easterbrook, makes the rather novel argument that the
~---------~
----~
legislative history - including the language of the Act neutral.

Brief 20, 24.

He argues, therefore, there is no

indication that Congress intended to foreclose private
remedies.

This view iqnores the various indications to

contrary mentioned above.

Moreover, if in fact both the

lanquaqe and legislative history were strictly neutral, who
would have the burden of showing a private right of action.
Would not one who a.sserts the right have it?
The strongest point made by respondent and the
is that in Blue Chip Stamps we approved the longstanding
view of the lower federal courts that a private cause of
action may be implied from §10(b) and Rule lOb-5.

The

opinion in Blue Chip Stamps noted that "this Court had no
occasion to deal with the subject until 20-odd years" after
the seminal Cardon decision had inferred a cause of action
under these provisions, and that in two cases decided in
1971 and 1972, respectively, "we confirmed with virtually
discussion the overwhelming consensus of the district
and courts of appeals that such a cause of action did
exist".

This inference was sustained despite the fact that

other provisions of the Securities Act did provide expressly

s.
for civil remedies.

I would welcome any insight from my

clerk as to the effect of the Court's holding with respect
to lO(b) and lOb-S on petitioner's basic argument that the
language and legislative history of the Advisers Act (as
compared with the other Securities Act statutes) strongly
support a no private right of action view.

At least, it can

be said - as the opinion in Blue Chip Stamps suggests - that
after 20-odd years of acceptance by district and courts of
appeals and without any contrary reaction by Congress, this
Court accepted established precedent "with virtually no
discussion". There has been no comparable period of
acceptance as to §214.
I do not view the other three factors of Cort v.
Ash to be more than make weights in this case.

Fair

I

arguments can be made on both sides as to whether the
plaintiff (respondent here) is a member of the class "for
whose especial benefit this statute was enacted".
Similarly, it is not clear whether an implied civil action
is "consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme".

I do think the fourth factor (whether

the cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state
law") does cut in favor of petitioner.

Both at common law,

and by statute in many cases, suits for negligence and
certainly for fraud can be brought against petitioners in
this case.

Indeed, respondent's complaint contains common

6.

law averments.
I would like my clerk's advice with respect to the
final argument made by petitioner:

that "implying a private

right of action for damages under the Advisers Act would
destroy the limitations on private actions by investors"
established in Blue Chip Stamps (requiring a purchase or
sale as a prerequisite to suit), and in Ernst & Ernst
(limiting damage suits to fraud or at least gross
negligence.

Judge Gurfein made this point quite forcefully,

and - at least on the surface

it has substantial appeal.

The SG's brief makes quite an argument to the contrary,
I do not fully understand.
In sum, and based on a snowbound three hours
the briefs, I continue to lean to the Gurfein and Wallace
view.

Moreover, increasingly I have come to think that the

Court has gone much too far in inferring federal private
causes of action where Congress has chosen to remain silent.
Principles of federalism, where state courts traditionally
have exercised jurisdiction over a particular type claim,
should require that Congress confront openly the question
whether there are sound reasons for also authorizing federal
court suits.

One even can suspect that the draftsmen and

sponsors of legislation, taking note of what can be
described as the eagerness of federal courts to enhance
their own jurisdiction, deliberately avoid legislative

hearings and controversy simply by drafting statutes in what
Easterbook calls a "neutral" fashion.
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of action be

2. PARTIES CONTENTIONS.
A.

Petitioner.

only the question whether a private right of action for damages

{p )11

a¥"' '\IIJLJ
(T

be

maintained

~ument,

~

j~~~~
'- ~
y_. ·"'
-t'

may

opin_ion

forcefully

the
by

Act.
Judge

in Abrahamson ::..:_ Fleschner,

"horize

~~mages.

made

under

Ini tally,
Gurfein

l?etr
in

his

that the Act's

pressed

dissenting
failure

actions at law bars creation of a private riqht
Section

214

confers

the

to
for

jurisdiction over "all suits in

. ~fZII/~

equity to enjoin any violation

~~.;-?11¥6
t.vz.ZL ~ trV
~
~6D.~'
of this subchapter or the rules,

'3

([:)

~

regulations, or orders thereunder." In contrast, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, companion to the Investment Advisors

~he

Securities Act of 1933,

an~e

Act, ~~

Securities Act of 1934 each
;:::::::::;-

give courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equi!Y and actions
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created." See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (Investment Company Act); 15 U.S.C. §77v (Act of
1933);

15 U.S.C.

§78aa (Act of 1934). Further, petr notes that

early versions of the Act simply adopted the language contained
in the

Investment Company Act;

but the final version,

adopted

after hearings and negotiations with the SEC, omitted mention of
) actions at law •

...-------.....

Second, petr argues that consideration of the four-part
test of Cort v. Ash leads to the conclusion that the Act does
not afford

an action

protect investors.

for damages:

( 1)

The Act

is designed

There is a distinction, however,

statute's

goals

and

Although

Congress

the

means

intended

disclosure and SEC regulation,

chosen
to

to

reach

protect

to

between a

those

investors

the Act was not passed

goals.
through
for

the

special benefit of investors seeking money damages.
(2)
that

The legislative history does not clearly indicate

Congress

intended

to

create

an

action

for

damages.

The

basic approach of the Act was to obtain a compulsory census of
the

industry--a

damages.

goal

irrelevant

to

a

cause

of

action

~~

for

The Act does not confer jursidiction over actions at

law.

Further,

provision

of

unlike
the

other

Act

federal

provides

for

securities
civil

acts,

liability,

no
thus

indicating that Congress was not ready to impose civil liability
for violation of the Act.
strengthen

the

In 1960, Congress amended the Act to

enforcement

powers

provide for actions at law.

In

of

the

SEC

but

it did

not

1970 Congress amended both the

Investment Company Act and the Act.

A private cause of action

was added only to the Investment Company Act.

In 1976 and 1977

bills to extend section 214 to actions at law were introduced
into Congress, but did not come to a vote in either house.
( 3)

Implying

a

cause

of

action

fulfill the main purposes of the Act.

is

not

necessary

to

The basic approach of the

Act is to conduct a compulsory census of the industry. The Act
also protect advisors from premature disclosure of ongoing SEC
investigations.
public

from

Assuming that another purpose is to protect the
fraudulent

or

negligent

investment

advisors,

implication of an action for damages is not necessary to carry
out

the

objectives

of

the

Act.

See

Piper

v.

Chris-Craft

Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 214-26 (1977). Even if creation of
an

action

for

damages

would

be

consistent

with

the

existence of regulatory remedies demonstrates that

Act,

the

implication

of an action for damages is not necessary.
(4) Actions for misrepresentation or nondisclosure and

~~ ~ocutriotns
~~pv~- ~

wv9/

for breach of a fiduciary duty are a mainstay of state

litigation.

The complaint charges that the advisor failed

to register under the Act, that it received excessive fees, and
that conflict of interest, breach of fidicuary duty and breach
of

trust

plagued

the

relationship

between

the

corporate

investor, its advisor, and the corporation that controlled both.
Such issues are often litigated in the state courts.

The fact

that the Act regulates investment advisors on a national scale
does not mean that a federal cause of action must be created.
See Piper, 430 U.S. at 40-41.
Finally,
action

for

petr

damages

argues

would

that

be

underlying Blue Chip Stamps

implication of

inconsistent

~

with

a

cause of

the

policies

Manor Drug Stores,

412 U.S 723

(1975).

Plaintiffs may allege that they were injured by failing

to

action

take

This

would

upon reliance on fraudulent

pose

the

same

problems

of

investment adivce.

proof

and

judicial

administration raised when 10b plaintiffs who had not purchased
securities attmepted to seek legal redress.

Furthermore,

it is

not clear whether negligent behavior would be actionable under
the Act. See

Ernst~ Ernst~

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

B. Respondent. Resp notes that petr addressed only the
issue whether an cause of action for damages could be
under

the Act.

In

fact,

resp points out,

both equitable relief and damages.
the Court is,
damages
Resp

therefore,

or equitable

begins

by

implied

its complaint seeks

The proper question before

whether a cause of action either for

relief may be maintained

establishing

a

history

of

under

implied

the

Act.

causes

of

action in common law and this Court's precedent. Further, resp

__

contends
......__

that

.~_...~

.-....,

implication
~

of

a

cause

of

action

here

is

......

~

consistent with the genesis of a cause of action under 1 Ob-5.
-- ....___._. ........_
Of particular relevance is the existence of section 215 of the
~-

Act which provides that contracts in violation of the Act are
The

void.

existence

of

a

similar

provision

in

the

1934

Act

played a prominent role in the early decision to imply a cause
of action under 10b-5. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Second, resp argues that Cort v. Ash test is satisfied
in

this

case:

investors

( 1)

in

The

their

Act

was

dealings

passed
with

for

the

investment

protection
advisors.

of
The

existence of other purposes behind

the Act does not take away

from this primary goal.

is some

( 2)

There

implicit indication

that Congress intended to create private rights under the Act;
there
does

is

no

not

Reports

indication

include
described

to

actions
the

the
at

section

contrary.

law,
as

both

Although
the

comparable

section 214

Senate
to

Company Act, which did contain such a provision.

the

and

House

Invesment

The failure to

include actions of law within section 214 is unexplained. Most
likely, the phrase "actions at law" was omitted from section 214
because
Act.

no

civil

Further,

violation

of

liability

section
the

Act

actions

215,
are

which

void,

were

authorized

states

expressly

that

under

contracts

creates

a

the
in

private

action for equitable relief. In 1960 and 1970, Conqress did not

consider any proposal to create a right of action under the Act.
Its failure to create a private right of action is,

therefore,

meaningless. The proposed 1976 and 1977 amendments were intended
to clarify,

not change,

the present law.

Even if legislative

history is ambiguous, the existence of section 206, proscribing
fraudulent,

misleading,

section 215,
void,

and

deceptive

declaring contracts made

provide

implicit

private remedies.

( 3)

congressional

conduct,

along

with

in violation of the Act
intention

to

create

some

Implication of a private cause of action

is consistent with the legislative scheme, and indeed necessary
to

avoid

nullification

resources
Act

to

creates

regulate
a

system

of

section

investment
of

federal

The

215.

advisors

SEC

lacks

completely.

regulation

over

( 4)

the
The

investement

advisors, therefore the guarantee of rights and remedies should
be uniform across the nation.
Finally,
consideration

-

resp

supports

contends
the

that

-

every

implication of

a

valid

pol~cy

cause of

action.

...........

The problem of scienter poses no difficulty because the rule of
Ernst

~

Act.

Implication of a cause of action would not run afoul of

Ernst will presumably be applied to actions under the

the concerns expressed in Blue Chip Stamps. There the Court was
concerned

with

claims

brought

relationship with defendants.

by

plaintiffs

Here only

the

who

1 imi ted

had

no

class of

persons who can assert claims in connection with the making or
performance of a

contract can become plaintiffs.

Accordingly,

there is no possiblity that the plaintiff class can be boundless
and

self-defined.

demonstrate

Insofar

what

he

as

would

a

case demands

have

done,

that

courts

a

plaintiff

can

establish

evidentiary guidelines to aid the trier of fact.

c.

The

Solicitor

The

General.

-

SG

argues

that

application of the Cort v. Ash test mandates creation of a cause

____....._.._

-

of action under the Act:

( 1) The 1 i teral text of section 206,

prohibiting

fraud

deceit

investment

advisors,

and

practiced

demonstrates

that

upon

resps

are

clients

of

within

the

class for whose especial benefit the Act was enacted.
is

no

indication

remedies.

that

Nothing

in

Congress
the

intended

to

(2) There

foreclose

private

legislative history demonstrates why

section 214 was passed in its present form. It was not, however,
the product of a compromise struck with the investment advisors
industry,

because

none

the

industry

directed

at

issue of remedies.

In

forms of

fact,

the history behind section 214 is neutral. Judge Gurfein
incorrect

bill dealt with the

comments

early

was

the

of

in assuming

that the presence of administrative

and criminal remedies prohibits implication of a private remedy.
Such

a

theory

would

foreclose

the

implication of

any private

remedies. Section 206 creates duties under the Act. Section 215
creates

a

private

equitable

action

and

strongly

intention to create a private action for damages.
requitable

relief

monetary relief.

of

recission

Conqress' s

and

restitution

suggests
Indeed,
would

the
even

include

subsequent legislative action with

respect to the Act does not indicate an intention to foreclose
private relief.

(3) Private remedies are necessary to effectuate

congressional goals.
abuses

by

The purpose of

investment

advisors.

the Act was

The

to eliminate

suggestion

that

it

was

intended simply as a census of the investment advisors industry
ignores

the

anti-fraud

availibility

of

provisions

administrative

the

Act

and

injunctions

and

criminal

penalties for violation of the Act.
damage

actions

would

increase
Given

all

a

advisors,

supplement to federal

the

without

SEC's

private

activities.

the

The availability of private

deterrence

with public enforcement.
investment

of

inability

action would

( 4)

conflicting
to

be

a

Regulation of

police
helpful

investment

advisors has not been a traditional concern of the states. State
State common law

regulation of investment advisors is limited.

dotrines based on trust relationships may not be relevant to an
advisor who sells only his expertise. And use of state law could
create

inconsistent

obligations

among

investment

advisors

located in different states.
The SG also contends that creation of private remedies
is consistent with Blue Chip Stamps.
Stamps

was

based

upon

the

Section

10b.

limitation

of

1 imitation,

thus reflecting

by

investment

sale.

advisors

Nevertheless,

may

The holding in Blue Chip

explicit
206

contains

recognition
be

section

"purchase

that

unconnected
206

duties

and

sale"

no

comparable

fraud

perpetrated

to

any

particular

are

not

open-ended

in the best position to create a private right of action under
the Act.
amicus,

Finally, petr, responding to a suggestion made by one
contends

that

it

would

not

be

liable

under

the

Investment Act even if a cause of action exists. Although these
contentions

were

not

treated

by

either

lower

court,

petr

suggests this Court may wish to consider the issues.
3. ANALYSIS.

The question whether a private action for
s ~mp~e

damages should be implied from the Act is fairly
to

your

analysis

dissenting).

None

in

Cannon

of

the

v.

City

parties

of

Chicago

argues

that

2.ursuant

(Powell,

the

J.,

legislative

history indicates without doubt a congressional intent to create
a private action for damages.

~

ta~J·

)t.VY1~ .

history

.

~v"

~

1

~~

,

is essentially ambiguous.

Nor

--....

is the

language of the

statute itself demonstrably more helpful. Section 206 prohibits

~certain
~

-

They agree that the legislative

activities
for

unlawful

prospective

notice,

or

over

"to

214

"all

subchapter

to

engage
is

suits

in

the

engage
in

in

any

j ur isd iction
equity

rules,

advisors.

advisor

fraudulent,

confers

or

investment

investment

client,

which

business
Section

an

by

to

to

Essentially

defraud

self-dealing

act,

or

federal

enjoin

regulations,

any
or

is

client

or

without

practice,

deceptive,
on

any

it

or

proper

course

of

manipulative."

and

state

violation
orders

courts

of

this

thereunder."

Section 215 provides that "[e]very contract made in violation of
any provision of this subchapter and every contract heretofore
or

hereafter

made,

the

performance

of

which

involves

the

violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice
in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule,
regulation,

or order

thereunder

shall be void .•.• "

as regards

any person who, in violation of the Act, made or engaged in the
performance of such a contract.

______

_

These sections taken together do not provide
"the most
.....

_

compelling
....

action

to

(Powell,

evidence

exist."

Congress

Cannon

v.

advisors

in

fact

intended

City of Chicago,

dissenting)

J. ,

investment

that

Section

enforceable

206

through

~-

such

slip op.

creates

at

duties

an
20
on

administrative

and

criminal remedies.

S~ fails

to mention "actions at law"

perhaps

as

the

because,

resp

urges,

Act

creates

no

civil

liability. But resp's argument actually supports the conclusion
that

Congress

rather

neatly

distinguished

equitable

relief,

available under the Act, from the recovery of damages, which is

"

not

').. \ '7

available.

~~·~
v_~hether
V"'

I.J.

section 215

~~e~ely ~-n ~vail able

r
,ffvpr~u~Ar'
sugg.es-ts-_."'t- h..,a t

v

~

? ;(;
\

is a

section

215 declares

~

remedy in equity,

defense,

as

petr

as

contracts void.

resp urges,

suggests,

-

its

or

presence

Congress knew exactly how ',...to
create .. rights
when ......it
,_, ...
"-··
'·
~·

"'·~

~

~

~

j;twished to_ do so.

y}A
~

Finally,

Application of Cort .'C.:. Ash to this case demonstrates
the

flaws

investment
benefit
the

in

that

advisors

doctrine.
constitute

I
a

believe
class

that
for

clients

whose

of

especial

the statute was enacted. I believe that application of

second,

and

most

important,

factor

demonstrates

that

'

.

Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action for
._.....-.,,,,,

damages.

~

...........

Nevertheless, the SG makes a respectable argument that

legislative intent is neutral.

Resolution of the third factor,

whether creation of a cause of action is consistent or necessary
to

the

purposes

of

the

regulatory

scheme,

depends

on

a

legislative-type judgment that weighs the liklihood of greater

........ ....._-.....,_

~

deterrence aqainst the costs of increased litigation.

Under the

Piper standard, application of the fourth factor should lead to
the conclusion that remedies for fraud have been traditionally
available in the state courts. I would conclude that application
of Cort v.

-

a decision

Ash yields

sh~d.

-

that no action

for

damages

Yet, if one accepts the proposition that the

second factor is neutral, a respectable argume nt can be made the
other way.
Such an expansive view illustrates the dangers of the
doctrine.
means.

Use

The

exercises

defined

Cort

four-part

skillful

appropriate
court

of

for

which

v.

Ash

test

evils.

identifies

a

class of persons

to

to

decide

fails

discretion

which

-

severs

Instead

legislative
recognize

the

legislative

to

create

that

which

remedies

from

Congress

remedies

standard

purpose

goals

allows

protecting

Congress

did

are
any
a
not

create.
Moreover, Cort
of

the

federal

wrong

~

party--where

courts

should

Ash places the burden of persuasion
legislative

refuse

to

intent

imply

a

is
cause

neutral,
of

the

action.

Instead,

resp

and

the

SG

contend

that

amibguous

legislative

history cuts in their favor. This argument is exactly backwards.
If it is a good idea to create a private cause of action under
the

Act,

Congress

can

do

so.

In

fact,

such

legislation

was

introduced without success in 1976 and 1977 and has not been reintroduced since.
Furthermore,

implication

of

a

cause

of

action

for

damages would create some, if not all, of the dangers alluded to
in

Blue

situation
partners
partners.
learned

Chip
-·

Stamps.

present
in

an

in

Consider,
Abrahamson.

investment

the

Plaintiffs

1969 or January

partnership

unregistered securities.

example,

partnership managed

In either December
that

for

was

the

factual

were

limited

by

two

1970,

investing

general

plaintiffs
heavily

in

They withdrew from the partnership at

the earliest possible date under their contract on September 30,
1970.

They

filed

a

court

action

in

January,

1971.

In

his

dissent Judge Gurfein noted that plaintiffs could have sued on
the basis of fraud as soon as they learned of the partnership's
investment scheme.

Instead,

they waited

a

year.

Judge Gurfein

contended that the difficulty of proving the motivation for the
plaintiff's failure to act implicates the same concern expressed
in Blue Chip Stamps that difficult problems of proof would arise
when a plaintiff claimed that he did not purchase stock because
of defendant's actions.
Stamps

concurrence notes

421 U.S. at 745-46.
"[p] rovng,

As your Blue Chip

after the fact,

what

'one

would have done' encompasses a number of conjectural as well as
subjective issues." 421 U.S. at 758 n.2
The SG's responds to this argument by suggesting that
the

class

privity

of

with

plaintiffs
investment

would

be

advisors.

restricted
Although

to

such

persons
a

in

limitation

would not alleviate the difficulty of proving the motivation for
inaction,
that

it would ease the fear of the Blue Chip Stamps Court

a

potentially

limitless

and

unidentifiable

class

of

plaintiffs may exist. See 421 U.S. at 747. Such a construction
may conflict with the clear language of the Act, which protects
prospective clients as well as clients,
could

be

interpreted

contact with an

to

although that langauge

include only persons

investment advisor.

who made

My own view

actual

is that the

difficulty of proof is a secondary consideration. As your Blue
Chip

Stamps

concurrence

emphasized,

"[t] he

starting

point

in

every case involving construction of a statute is the language
\
)

itself." In this case, neither the language nor the legislative
----

it

----

\\,.

history supports creation of a cause of action for damages.

-

On

its

face,

' .. language

the

implication of a cause of action for

of

section

215

equita ~ rel ~ .

supports

The issue

is squarely before the Court because the plaintiff below, resp
herein,

-

requested

complaint

several

including

---

-----~.-- ....

-

a

from carrying out the
and

-

the advisor,

that

forms

request

of

equitable

relief

in

his

that tha Jefendants ;: enjoined
..__

contract

between

contract be set aside,

the

~~ stor

and ~ the

defendants return all profits. The district court dismissed the
complaint in its entirety and the court of appeals affirmed.

~, ~ ·
~ f~

The legislative history behind section 215 is sparse.
Both the Senate and House reports

-

indicate that the section is

modeled after section 47 of the Investment Company Act. See H.R.
Rep.

76-2639

at

S.

30~

Rep.

76-1775

---

at

23.

The

language

of

section 47 of the Investment Company Act is virtually identical
to

section

215.

The

--

-

legislative

history

behind

section

47

indicates that it contains the "usual" provisions pertaining the
validity of contracts. See H.R. Rep. 76-2639 at

27~

S. Rep. 76-

1775 at 20. Among the usual provisions is section 29 of the 1934
Act which has been interpreted to mean that contracts made in
violation of various
option of
735.

section of

the deceived party."

See also Mills v.

the Act

"are voidable

Blue Chip Stamps,

Electric Auto-Lite,

421

396 U.S.

at

the

U.S.
375,

at
387

(1970).
In

his Abrahamson dissent,

Judge Gurfein argued

that

the existence of 215 does not necessarily command the creation
of a private action, although he recognized that the creation of
an equitable action would be consistent with section 214 and the
notion that it is only actions at law that are inconsistent with
the stautotry scheme.
even
dissent

under

I believe that an equitable action may be
the

in Cannon v.

stringent standards set

City of Chicago.

cause of action may be

implied

You

forth

recognized

if the failure

by your
that

a

to do so would

7

frustrate clear congressional intent. See slip. op. at 5. Here
Congress has declared certain contracts
the

SEC

may

be

able

to

employ

to be void.

section

215

as

Although

a

basis

for

injuctive relief, its failure to do so would bind a party to an
illegal

barg~in

its own.
to

a

unless that party could seek equitable relief on

Petr contends that section 215 creates only a defense

breach of

section 29,

contract

nor does

action,

it offer

but

it does

independent

not

distinguish

support

for

such a

construction.
Assuming that the language of section 215 does present
compelling congressional intent to create an equitable cause of
action under the Act, this Court should note the forms of relief
that

would

be

..._.._-

Friendly,
direction

available

section
to

29

apply

Pearlstein v.

of

to

plaintiffs.

the

a

Scudder

similar manner,

circumstances,~e

Act

"was

common-law principles of
~German,

1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
in

1934

According

then

entitled

Contracts,

429

F.2d

§1535

illegal

1136,

would,

::::::=on : nd
(1962).

Judge

legislative
bargain."

1149

If section 215 is

plaintiffs

:0

a

to

under

(2d Cir.

interpreted
apprpriate

restitution.

Corbin

See

distinguishes

from damages by noting that "in awarding damages the
to

~ut

the party in as good as position as he would

have occupied, had the contract been fully performed, while in
enforcing restitution,

--- -- -

the purpose is to require the wrongdoer

........

to restore what he has received and thus tend to put the injured

party in as good a position as that occupied by him before the
contract was made." Id. at§ 1107.
~

t~~

·I ~~~·

~Q_
W'

/~

Certainly

restitution under the Investment Advisors Act

woul~fu'andate refund of investment fees.
...._- - -·fiduciary in violation of his duty to the

Further,

"where

a

beneficiary disposes

uir of property entrusted to him as fiduciary, he holds any property

l!.. ~ f'

~v ...

.

rece1ve d

.
1n

exc h ange

beneficiary."
Similarly,
disposed

upon

Restatement

where

of,

a

a
of

property
plaintiff

.
cons t rue t 1ve
Restitution,

taken
is

trus t

by

to

entitled

198

§

fraud

f or

is

t he

(1937).

subsequently

enforce

either

a

constructive trust on the acquired property or an equitable lien
to

secure

these

his

c ~-J

for

Id.

reimbursement.

C;investment

principles,

advisors

at

would

§

202.

Under

be

obligated to
....
return the plaintiff's investment plus any profits the advisor

-,

inally, if a defendant who fraudulently

obtained

-obtained

property

property,

the

defendant

balance owed plaintiff.
mean

that a

exchange~

wrongfully
would

be

it

for

personally

less

valuable

liable

for

the

Id. Application of this principle might

plaintiff's economic redress would

include all of

his investment loss through the defendant's fraudulent actions.
The exact breadth of equitable remedies would have to
be fleshed out by the lower courts on a case-by-case basis. As
the above examples illustrate there may be a divergence between

1

-

disgorging

-'--'
investment

benefits

fees

the

and profits,

defendant
and placing

received,

including

the plaintiff

in his

:?

•

1 8.

original

position,

which

would

demand

the

payment

of

all

investment funds lost due to a violation of the Act. That case
law which has developed under the contract validity sections has
focused mainly on section 29 of the 1934 Act.

It is not always

helpful because of the tendency to incorportate discussions of
equitable remedies with the proper measurement of damages. See
e.g.,
1976).

Galfand

Corp.,

~Chestnutt

It does

appear,

however,

545 F.2d

807,

814

(2d Cir.

that calculation of equitable

\

remedies

demands

consideration

of

the

type

and

degree

of

illegality, and the possibility that the plaintiff may obtain an
underserved windfall.

See Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Pat

Ryan Associates, 496 F.2d 1255, 1265-67 (4th Cir.) cert. denied
419 U.S.
1 1 36,

1023

(1974);

1149

(2d

Furthermore,
Otherwise

a

a

Pearlstein~

Cir.

request

1970)(Friendly,
for

party might

Scudder~

recission

be

able

to

must

German, 429 F.2d
dissenting).

J. ,

be

safeguard

made
his

promptly.
investment

simply by noting illegal action, then observing the market. See
Baumel

v.

Rosen,

412

F.2d

571,

574-75

denied 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Myzel

(4th Cir.

~Field,

41 n.15 (8th Cir. 1967) cert. denied 390

u.s.

1969)

cert.

386 F.2d 718, 740951 (1968).

Implication of only an equitable cause of action may,
however,
action

draw

for

fire

damages

from
as

those

well.

would

In

would

particular,

favor
resp

implying
argues

an

that

because section 29 has provided support for the creation of a
pri f ate right of action under

1 Ob,

section 215 should play a

similar role here.

There are four responses to this argument:

(1) Part of the reliance on section 29 is based on the existence
of a statute of limitations,
215. See

Fischman~

787

(2d

n.4

Cir.

a feature not present in section

Raytheon Manufacturing Co.,

1951).

(Other

cases,

188 F.2d 783,

however,

relied

upon

section 29 without mention of the statute of 1 imitations.

See

Kardon v.

(E.D.

Pa.

at 735.)

(2)

1946);

National Gypsum Co.,
generally~

see

69 F.

Supp.

Chip Stamps,

512,

514

u.s.

421

Creation of an action for damages under 10b is distinguishable
because the 1934 Act contains sections explicitly creating civil
liability,

see

jurisdiction

e.g. ,

over

15

actions

addition to section 29.

I

u.s.c.
at

--

The

78i(e),

§

law,

see

and

u.s.c.

15

conferring
§

78aa

in

Investment Adivosrs Act contains

--

neither express civil liabiity provisions, nor a jurisdictional

---

~

grant over actions at law. (3) The creation of a cause of action
under

1 Ob was well-settled long before this Court finally put

its imprimatur on the doctrine. Private actions under 10b are an
historical

oddity

which

should

not

control

the

continued

evolution of the law governing implied private rights of action.
Cf.

Cannon

v.

dissenting).

City of Chicago,

slip op.

at

7n.6

(Powell J.,

(4) The conclusion that Congress intended to create

private equitable actions does not by itself provide clear and
convincing support for the proposition that Congress intended to
create

a

exclusion

private
of

action

for

jurisdiction

over

damages.
actions

Indeed,
at

law,

given

the

the

soundest

~v .

Vi/vv-0

conclusion

is

that

Congress

carefully

distinguished

equitable and legal remedies. See text at 11 supra.

between

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, No 77-1645

Both

Petitioner and

the Solicitor General have

supplemental briefs which address two issues:
this Court's

filed

(1) The effect of

recent decisions on the issue whether a cause of

action should be

implied under the

Investment Advisors Act of

1940, and (2) The proper scope of relief for private plaintiffs
under the Act.
1. THIS COURT'S RECENT DECISIONS.
decision

in

their

favor

would

Court decisions.

In Touche Ross

(June

the

18,

1979)

Court

be
~

held

Petrs contend that a

consistent
Co.
that

~

with

two

recent

Redington, 47 LW 4732

section

17(a}

of

the

2.

Securities

Act

action.

Cannon~

In

of

1934

does

not

afford

a

private

right

of

University of Chicago, 47 LW 4549 (May 14,

1979) the Court held that a private litigant may sue to enforce
Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972
Petr
that

the

contends

resps

that

embrace.

Touche

The

Ross

Court

rejects

expressly

the

stated

approach
that

the

question of construction of a private right of action is based

-

~~--~------~~----------------

upon statutory construction, and not general tort principles. 47
LW at 4734.

In this case, as in Touche Ross, Congress knew how

to create private actions when it wished to do so.

Further, the

Touche Ross Court emphasized that reference to general remedial
purposes is not sufficient to justify implication of a cause of
action.

47

indications

Ill"'~

at

that

actions.

~r~
lA!· tr}

LW

4737.

Congress

. vCannon

In

1ts

In

this

did

not

decision,

case

abundant

to

allow

private

this

found

Court

abundant

,....llaouz ....

.:_.___

it

passed

attorney's

fees

Title

for

IX,

Congress

private parties,

implication of causes of action.
passed

are

intent

ev2; den~:;_~-i.._:2_._t...!...n_ t_...,_
....t...~
---l-~-P-:

When

there

to

attorney's

Investment
fees

for

Advisors
private

a_ ...
c_a_u_s_e__o_f__a_c_t_ ion.
authorized

expressly

and

relied

upon

judicial

In contrast, the Congress that
Act

parties,

of

1940

and

it

did

not

acted

provide

before

any

private rights of action had been implied from secuities laws.
The
threshold

SG

test

believes
for

that

application

the
of

two
Cort:

cases
does

establish
the

a

statutory

3.

language

demonstrate

that

the

statute

was

enacted

for

benefit of a special class of which plaintiff is a member.
Act

creates

federal

fiduciary

standards,

see

Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11
for

the

benefit

of

investors.

The

Sante

Fe

( 1977), which

---

operate

the

Section

206,

which

provides that it shall be unlawful for any investment advisor to
defraud any client,

thus meets the threshold standard.

Unlike

the section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, section 206 prohibits certain
conduct

and

creates

federal

rights

in

favor

of

clients.

See

Touche Ross, 47 LW at 4735.
Second, the SG argues that because the langauge of the
Act demonstrates that it was enacted for a special class,

the

silent legislative history does not weigh against implication of
a remedy.

The Cannon Court recognized that legislative history

will usually be silent or ambiguous on implication of a remedy.
See 47 LW at 4553.

F~rther,

the SG contends that congressional

failure to amend the statute in recent years does not mean that
Congress decided

against providi.bg

a private cause of action,

because Congress relied upon the judiciary's willingness . to

.Je~

create private rights of action.
Third,

the

SG

relies

on

Cannon

conclusion

that

implication of

a

consistent

with

the

scheme.

noted that

it

had

statutory

"never withheld

private

a

In

to

right

support
of

Cannon,

the

action
the

is

Court

private remedy where

4/~

the

statute explicitly confers a benefit on a class of persons and

4.

where it does not assure those persons the ability to activate
and

participate

in

the

administrative process contemplated

the statute." 47 LW at 4556 n.41.

by

In this case, the Investment

Advisors Act does not allow participation of defrauded clients
in admnistrative proceedings, and the injunctive relief usually
obtained by the SEC will not redress clients• injuries.
Fourth,

the

SG

repeats

his

earlier

arguement

that

implication of a cause of action is necessary.
The ) SG makes

an additional contention.

He notes the

recent statement that a jurisdictional section "creates no cause
of

action

of

The

liabilities.
found,

its

own

source

force
of

the

and

effect:

plaintiffs•

it

imposes

rights

must

no
be

-

if at al, in the substantive provisions
•.• " Touche Ross,
.

4 7 LW at 4 7 3 7 •

Thus,

the SG argues that the ommission of the

term "actions at law" in setion 214 is of no moment.
I

believe

petr•s position.

-----..-

that

the

two

cases

generally

support

the

Although some of the Cannon language is broad,

its holding is based on the Court's perception of congressional
intent

and

reliance

causes of action.
may

have

remedies.
passed

the

on

the

judiciary's

willingness

to

imply

Title IX was passed at a time when Congress

reasonably

believed

As petrs note,
Investment

that

$

cour t;,..

provide

private

the same was not true when Congress
Advisors

Act.

The

SG

attempts

to

circumvent this point by arguing that Congress• failure to amend
the Act in recent years was in reliance upon the expectation of

5.

judicial

action.

expressly

But

recognized

the
the

SG relies on
split

in

the

a

Senate

lower

report

courts

that

over

the

issue of whether a cause of action could be implied under the
Act.

See S.

committee
term

No. 94-910

Rep.

recommended

"action

Congress.

at

that

law",

8-9 (1976).

214 be amended

section

that

Although the Senate

amendment

was

not

to

add

adopted

the
by

It thus appears that Congress was on full notice that

courts would not necessarily imply causes of action under the

)~

/ Act.
On the other hand, Touche Ross is helpful precedent to
the petr.
of

a

The Court recognized that the question of implication

statutory

construction,
Instead,

and

"our

I

cause
is

task

of
not

is

action
based

1 imi ted

is
on

an

issue

general

solely

to

tort

of

statutory '

principles.

determining

whether

Congress intended to create the private right of action •..• "
LW at 4734.

Cort v.

Ash.

has not

said

----

action.

T~

47

Further, the Court commented on the application of
Although Cort set forth four factors,
they

Indeed,

are

entitled

to equal weight.

the Court

The central

the first three inquiries in the Cort test are

traditional

measures

of

legislative

The Court 1 s

explanation that

intent.

47

LW

at

4736 •

the role of the Cort test is to

divine legislative intent rebuts the proposition avidly pursued
by the SG that neutral legislative intent favors implication of
a cause of action.

'.

6.

2.

SCOPE

· oF

REMEDIES.

Petr

that

contends

no
<::.::

distinction should be made between equitable and

-:::::::::::::- ____

Petr

fears

available
_,
Chasins

that

would

v.

-------

this Court's holding
allow

Smith

the

~

Barney

~Taylor,

1970); Janigan

award
Co~,

legal relief. ]

damages.

See

-

e.g.

F.2d

(2d

Cir.

that equitable relief

of

-

money

Inc.

344 F.2d 781

438

1167

is

,

(1st Cir. 1965).

The SG, on the other hand, argues that both legal and
equitable

remedies

should

be

available.

The SG contends

-----

that

equitable principles

alone will

injuries.
.......
........._...

Moreover,

the SG argues that the lower courts never

addressed

the

Therefore,

scope

this

of

Court

not

redress

available

remedies

should

fully

allow

those

client's

an

the

under

issues

to

be

Act.
worked

through by the lower courts.

fear~
about the_...............
failure of courts
,....,.
_..

I believe that petr's
........__.....
to

distinguish

~·

between

Nevertheless,

apprehension.

equitable

relief

- and

damages

is

well

the cases petr cites do not support its

In Chasins,

the court awarded damages in a 10b-5

action, which was clearly appropriate because both equitable and
legal

relief

equitable

are

relief

available.
can

force

In Janigan
a

defendant

fraudulent action to disgorge his profits.
may be substantial,

it

is different

than

the

court

who

has

noted
engaged

that
in

Although this amount
the right

to recover

one's expectancy, which is the measurement for damages.
introduced

-

cases

that

clearly

______________

deomonstrate the distinction between legal and equitable relief,

~~----------~,-~-,-------~~--~>----~,_

~,

~

yet

the

distinction

Court decide

that

will

the

be

of

major

importance

Investment Advisors Act

award of equitable relief.

should

only

this

allows

If this path were followed, it

he

~ould

---

be important to warn the lower courts that equitable relief does
~

......

.._,._,. .._..

"""-'

allow a plaintiff to be put in the position that he would
-not
- - ~--------~~----~'-------~----~~----------------------------------the contract been carried out.
Beyond that
instruction,
apply

this Court will

equitable

principles of

case-by-case basis.
Advisors

Act

to

----------

U.S. 462, 471 n.11
depend

to rely on

recission

and

lower courts to
restitution on

a

Because "Congress intended the Investment
establish

investment advisors,"

duties

have

""--

federal

fiduciary

Santa Fe Industries,

---

In£·

standards

for

~

430

Green,

(1977), the extent and nature of an advisor's

on

the

nature

circumstances of each case.
Money Managers 344,

645-46

of

the

relationship

See 2 Frankel,
(1978).

and

the

The Regulation of

Courts would also have

to

determine whether an advisor's violation of the Act amounts to
fraud.

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, No. 77-1645

s, ~~~~·~J~~

~~~<t,Jt...t_ +~~~
In a typ ~~.#~c~se,~ - ~ £aintiff alleging violation j of
-.~__,~-e-r.
~r-·
~~
the Act might be able to seek 1ve
of monet ry

diff~types

-

relief.
invest

Assume

that

in January,

a

plaintiff gave

1978 and discovered

his account had shrunk to $5,000.
return of the $5,000
paid

from

Janurary

( 2)
to

an advisor

in December,

to

1978 that

Plaintiff could seek (1) the

the return of any

December,

$100,000

( 3)

the

investment

fees

he

disgorgement

of

any

profits the advisor made through self-dealing,

(4)

the payment

of the $95,000 necessary to return him to the position he was in
when

he made

the

investment,

or

( 5)

the

amount of

profit

he

'-·

.

'

would have made if the advisor had not violated the Act.
The first two catagories are clearly available as part
of the equitable relief of recission and restitution.

The fifth

clearly is not, because it measures the plaintiff's expectancy-the proper measure for damages.
As~ng

Restatement

that the advisor has acted as a fiduciary, the

/hA.

~Restitution

requires that he disgorge any

he has received from the transaction.
advisor

has

acted

fraudulently.

prof~s

The same is true if the
In

these

circumstances,

therefore, catagory three relief would be available.
The
fraudulently
......___--

Restatement
obtains

also

property

states
and

who

a

that

exchanges

who

person
it

for

less

valuable property is liable for the balance owed the plaintiff.
Thus

if

the

advisor

acted

fraudulently,

the

plaintiff

could

recover catagory four costs also.
The ability of a plaintiff to obtain any of the forms
of equitable relief is contingent, of course,

upon the proper

application

For

of

other

equitable

principles.

example,

a

request for recission must be made promptly.
If

the

Court decides

relief is available,

that

equitable,

but

not

legal,

I would suggest that the Court either

(a)

allow lower courts to flesh out the issue of scope of relief, or
(b) sketch the general principles outlined above.

· ~fZII/~

~~;711¥6

~~u--v

~

~C<o.~,

equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the rules,
~

'3
~

regulations, or orders thereunder." In contrast, the Investment ~~
Company Act of 1940, companion to the Investment Advisors

~he

Securities Act of 1933,

an~e

Act, ~h

Securities Act of 1934 each
~

give courts jurisdiction over "all suits in equi_E:y and actions
at law brouqht to enforce any liability or duty created." See 15
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (Investment Company Act); 15 U.S.C. §77v (Act of
1933);

15 U.S.C.

§78aa (Act of 1934). Further, petr notes that

early versions of the Act simply adopted the language contained
in the

Investment Company Act;

but the

final version,

adopted

after hearings and negotiations with the SEC, omitted mention of
at law.
} actions
~
Second, petr argues that consideration of the four-part
test of Cort v. Ash leads to the conclusion that the Act does
not afford an action

for damages:

( 1)

The Act

is designed

There is a distinction, however,

protect investors.
statute's

goals

and

Although

Congress

the

means

intended

disclosure and SEC regulation,

chosen
to

to

reach

protect

to

between a

those

investors

goals.
through

the Act was not passed for

the

special benefit of investors seeking money damages.
(2)
that

-

The legislative histo'ry does not clearly indicate

Congress

intended

to

create

an

action

for

damages.

The

basic approach of the Act was to obtain a compulsory census of
the

industry--a

damages.

goal

irrelevant

to

a

cause

of

action

for

The Act does not confer jursidiction over actions at

To: The Chief JusticE'
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr.
Justice
X
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Mr. Justice Stevens
From: Hr. Justice Stewart
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1645
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA), et al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United Stares Court of Apv.
peals for the Ninth Circuit.
Harry Lewis.
[October -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-1
et seq., was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress had
found to exist in the investment advisers industry. The
question in this case is whether that Act creates a private
cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of persons
aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it.
The respondent, a shareholder of petitioner Mortgage Trust
of America (Trust), brought this suit in a federal district
court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a
class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders. Named as
defendants were the Trust, several individual trustees, the
Trust's investment adviser, Transamerica Mortgage Advisers,
Inc. (TAMA), and two corporations affiliated with TAMA,
Land Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), and Transamerica Corporation (Transamerica), all of which are petitioners in this
case.1
Hereinafter "the petitioners" refers to the petitioners other than the
Trust . The Trust is a real estate investment trust within the meaning of
§§ 856-858 of the Internal Revenue Code. TAMA, in addition to advising the Tnust, managed it:s day-to-day operat10ns. Transamerica is the
sponsor of the Trust and the parent of Land CapitaL Land Capital isthe parent of TAMA, through a subsidiary, and sold the Trust its initial
1
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TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS v. LEWIS

The respondent's complaint alleged that the petitioners in
the course of advising or managing the Trust had been guilty
of various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty. The complaint set out three causes of action, each said to arise under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 2 ·The first alleged that
the advisory contract between TAMA and the Trust was
unlawful because TAMA and Transamerica were not registered under the Act and because the contract had provided
for grossly excessive compensation. ·The second alleged that
the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty to the Trust by
causing it to purchase securities of inferior quality from Land
Capital. The third alleged that the petitioners had misappropriated profitable investment opportunities for the benefit
of other companies affiliated with Transamerica. The complaint sought injunctive relief to restrain further performance
of the advisory contract, rescission of the contract, restitution
of fees and other considerations paid by the Trust, an accounting of illegal profits, and an award of damages.
The trial court ruled that the Investment Advisers Act con-.
fers no private right of action, and accordingly dismissed the
complaint. 8 The Court of Appeals reversed, 575 F. 2d 237,
holding that "implication of a private right of action forinjunctive relief and damages in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting
the legislation." !d., at 239.4 We granted certiorari to conportfolio of investments. Several of the individual trustees were at the
time of suit affili1Lted with TAMA, Tran::;america, or other subsidiaries of
Transamerica.
2 Each cau::;e of action wa:s stated as a derivative shareholder':; claim
and restated as a shareholders class claim.
8 The pertinent orders of the Di::;trict. Court. are unreported .
4 The District Court was of the view that it was without subject-matter·
juri:::uiction of the respondent 'H suit. The Court of Appeal:; rerharacterized the District Court's order dismissing the suit as properly based upon
the respondent's failuN> to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6), noting that the respondent 's suit was:;
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sider the important federal question presented. - U . S . (1978).
The Investment Advisers Act nowhere expressly provides
for a private cause of action. The only provision of the Act
that authorizes any suits to enforce the duties or obligations
created by it is § 209, which permits the Securities Excha.nge
Commission (Commissiou) to bring suit in a federal district
court to enjoin violations of the Act or the rules promulgated
under it. 0 The argument is made, however, that the clients
apparently within the District Court's general federal-question jurisdiction undrr 28 U.S. C.§ 1331. 575 F. 2d, at 239, n. 2.
The Court of AppeallS in thi:; ca~Se followed the Courts of Appeal:; for the
Fifth and Second Circuits, which al~So have held that private causes of
action may be mainhtined under the Act. See Wilson v. Fi1'st Houston
Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschne1',
568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977).
8 Section 209, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9, provides in part al:l follows:
"(e) Whenever it ~hall appear to the Commission that any pert>'on
has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of a11y provision of thi:; subchapter, or of any rule,
regulation, or order hereunder, or that any per:son has aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured, is aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel,
command, induce, or procU11C :such a Yiolutiou, it may ill it,; di::~cretion
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, or the
proper United States court of auy Territory or other place subject to the
juri;;diction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices and to
enforce compliance with thi:; subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order
hereunder. Upon a showi11g that such person has engaged, is engaged, or
i;; about to engage in any such act or practice, or in aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring any such act or practice, a per~
manent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining order shall be
granted without bond. Tl1e CommiH~ion may transmit such evidence as
may be available concerning any violation of the provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, to the Attorney
General, who, in hi:; discretion, may institute the appropnate criminal
procedingr:; under this subchapt{'r."
The language in § 209 (e) that authorizes the Commis~ion to obtain an
injunction against per~ons "aiding, abetting, . .. or procuring" violations
of the Act wa8 added to the st~~tute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887.
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of investment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the
Act and that courts should therefore imply a private cause of
action in their favor. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
- U . S . - , - ; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78; .T.I. Case v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, - .
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action,
either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of
statutory construction. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U. S. - , - ; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, U. S., at - ; see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458
(hereinafter Amtrak). While some opinions of the Court
have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies
thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e. g.,
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S., at-; Cannon v.
University of Chicago, U. S., a t - . We accept this as
the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues
presented by the case before us.
Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute
itself. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S., a t - ;
Cannon v. Un·iversity of Chicago,-- U. S., a t - ; Santa Fe
Indust., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 24. It is asserted that the creation
of a private right of action can fairly be inferred from the·
language of two sections of the Act. The first is § 206, which
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,"'
or to eugage in specified transactions with clients without.
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making required disclosures. 6 The second is § 215, which provides that contracts whose formation or performance would
violate the Act "shall be void ... as regards the rights of"
t,he violator and knowing successors in interest/
6

Section 200, 15 U.S. C. § 80b-G, read;; as follows:
"§ SOb-6. Prohibited transactions by inve;;tment advi::;ers.
"It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by u:se of the mai!t~
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or
indirectly" (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
"(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or cour:;e of bu:siness which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
"(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any
security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for
a person other thm1 such client, knowingly to effect uny sale or purchase
of any security for the account of ::;uch client., without. disclosing to such
client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in
which he is acting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragra.ph i:lhal not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is
not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such trammction;
" ( 4) to engage in any act, practice, or cour::;e of business which i:s fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commi:;f:lion shall, for the purpo:;es
of thi,; paragraph ( 4) by rulei:l and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses
of bu::;iness as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
Section 206 (4) was added to the statute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. At that
time Congress also extended the provision~ of § 206 to all investment
adviser:;;, whether or not such advi~ers were required to register under
§ 203 of the Aet. Ibid.
7 Section 2-1-5, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-15, read::; in part as follows:
"§ SOb-15. Validity of contracts
"(b) Evrry contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any rrlation:ship or practice in violation of any provision of thi:; subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void ( 1) a:; rrga.rds the right~ of any
per:son who, in violation of any such proviHion, rule, regulation, or order,
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It is apparent that the two sections were intended to benefit
the clients of investment advisers, and, in the case of § 215,
the parties to advisory contracts as well. As we have previously recognized, § 206 establishes "federal fiduciary standards" to govern the conduct of investment advisers, Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S., at 471, n. 11; Burks v. Lasker,
U. S. - , - , n. 10; SEC v. Capital Gains Research
B·ureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 191-192. Indeed, the Act's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations. See H. R. Rep. No.
2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 28 (1940); S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th
Coug., 3d Sess., 21 ( 1940); SEC, Report on Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies (Investment Counsel and Investment Advisory Services), H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess., 27-30 (1939). But whether Congress intended additionally that these provisions would be enforced through private litigation is a different question.
On this question the legislative history of the Act is entirely silenl:r-a state of affairs not surprising when it is remembered that the Act concededly does not explicitly provide any
private remedies whatever. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, supra, U. S., at - . But while the absence of
anything in the legislative history that indicates an intention
to confer any private right of action is hardly helpful to the
respondent, it does not automatically undermine his position. This Court has held that the failure of Congress
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available. Cannon v. University of Chicago, U. S., at - .
Such an intent may appear implicitly in the language or
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any l:mch contract, and
(2) as rPgard:; thr rights of uny per~on who, not being a purty to such
contmd, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of ~uch contract was in violation of any such provi~ion . "
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skucture of the statute, or in the circumstances of its
enactment.
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory Ian ..
guage itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief
in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215
by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of v6id ..
ness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the
very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforcement of an investment advisers contract. But the legal consequences of voidness a.re typically not so limited. A per~on
with the power to avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a
court to have the contract rescinded and to obtain restitution
of consideration paid. See Deckert v. Independence Corp.,
311 U. S. 282. 289; Williston, Contracts, 3d edition, § 1525;
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th edition, §§ 881 and 1092.
And this Court has previously recognized that a comparable
provision, § 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S. C.§ 77cc (b), confers a "right to rescind" a contract void
under the criteria of the statute. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388. Moreover, the federal courts in gen ..
eral have viewed such language as implying an equitable cause
of action for rescission or similar relief. E. g., Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (DCED Pa.
1946); see III Loss, Securities Regulation 1758-1759 (2d ed .
1961). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U. S. 723, 735.
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress declared
in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the
customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including
the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction
against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution.8 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was
s One posrsibility, of course, is that Congre~s intended that claims tinder-
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correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain an action
on behalf of the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers
contract. 0
We view quite differently, however, the respondent's claims
for damages and other monetary relief under § 206. Unlike
§ 215, § 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in
terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability
to a private plaintiff is to be found, it must read it into the
Act. Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction
that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode,
it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v.
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See Amtrak, supra,
414 U. S., at 458; Sec'Urities Protection Investment Corp. v.
Barbo'Ur, 421 U. S. 412, 419; T: 1. M ·. E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U. S. 464. Congress expressly provided both judicial and
administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206.
First, under ~ 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in
federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including,
of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by
§ 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons
who violate the Act, including§ 206. In view of these express
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is
highly improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to
mention an intended private action." Cannon v. University
of Chicago,- U.S., a t - (PowELL, J., dissenting) .
§ 215 would be raised only in stale court. But we decline to adopt such
an anom<Llows construetion without some indication that Congress in fact
wi~hed to remit the litigation of a federal right to the state courts.
9 Juri;;diction of ;;uch i"uit;; would exist under § 214 which, though
referring in terms only to "suits in equity to enjoin viola tion:s," would
equally sustain actions where simple declaratory rE'lief or rescission is:
sought.

I

h
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Even settled rules of statutory COlJstruction could yield, of
course, to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
Securities Protection Investor Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412,
419; Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458. But what evidence of
intent exists in this case, circumstantial though it be, weighs
against the implication of a private right of action for a monetary award in a case such as this. Under each of the securities
laws that preceded the Act here in question, and under the
Investment Company Act which was enacted as companion
legislation, Congress expressly authorized private suits for
damages in prescribed circumstances.1 ° For example, Congress provided an express damage remedy for misrepresentations contained in an underwriter's registration statement in
§ 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and for certain materially misleading statements in § 18 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "Obviously, then, when Congress wished
to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so
and did so expressly." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, U. S., at 11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U. S., at 734 (1975); see Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458;
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S., at 471. The fact
that it enacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here
at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling
to impose any potential monetary liability to a private suitor.
See Abrahamson v. F'lechsner, 508 F. 2d, a t - (Gurfein, J.,
dissenting) .
The omission of any such potential remedy from the Act's
substantive provisions was paralleled in the jurisdictional sec1 0 See Securities Act of 1933, §§ ll and 12, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k and 771;
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9 (e), 16 (b), and 18, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 71i (e), 78p (b), and 78r; Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, §§ 16 (a) and 17 (b), 15 U. S. C. §§ 79p (H) and 79q (b); Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, § 323 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 77www (a); Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 30 (f), 15 U.S. C. § SOa-29 (f) .

1
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tion, § 214. 11 Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated
by reference a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, which gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liab·ility or duty created by" the statute (emphasis added).
SeeS. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 98 (introduced by Sen. Wagner, Mar. 14, 1940); H. R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 98 (introduced by Rep. Lea, Mar. 14, 1940). After hearings on the
bill in the Senate, representatives of the investment advisers
industry and the staff of the Commission met to discuss the
bill, and certain changes were made. The language that was
enacted as § 214 first appeared in this compromise version of
the bill. See Confidential Committee Print, S. 3580, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., § 213. That version, and the version finally
enacted into law, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 214, both
omitted any references to "actions at law" or· to "liability." 12
Section 214, 15 U. S. C. § 801.>-14, provides:
"§ SOb-14. Jurisdiction of offen~c"' and ::mill'.
"The district courts of the United States and the United States courts
of any Territory or other place :subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have jurisdiction of violation:; of thi:; subchapter or the rules,
regulations, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all suit:; in equity to enjoin any violation of thi::; ~Sub
chapter or the rules, regulations, or order:; thereunder. Any criminal
proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act. or tran::;a.ction
con:stituting the violation occurred. Any suit or Ltction to enjoin any
violation of this :;ubchapter or rules, regulatJOn:;, or order~ thereunder;
m.1y be brought in any ::;uch district or in the district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or tram;act::; business, and proce::;::; in such cases
may be served in any district of which the defendant i:s an inhabitant or·
transactR bu:siness or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgment::;
and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review as provided in section::;
225 and 347 of Title 28, and section 7, as amended, of the Act entitled
'An Act to e:stablish a court of appeab for the Di::;trict of Columbia,'
approved February 9, 1893. No costs shall be a::;sei:i<>ed for or agam::;t
the Commi::;sion in any proceeding under thb subchapter brought by or
ttgainst the Corruni:ssiou iu any court ."
lt The respondent argues that the omi::;:oio11 of any refert>uce in § 214
n
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The unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a jurisdic~
tiona} provision is, of course, not determinative of whether a
private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action
for anything beyond limited equitable relief.1 8
Helying on the factors identified in Cort v. Ash, supra, the
respondent and the Commission, as amicus curiae, argue that
our inquiry in this case cannot stop with the intent of Congress, but must consider the utility of a private remedy, and
to "actions at la.w" b without relevance because jurbdiction over such
cases as this would often exist under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general
federal-que.-stion jurisdiction Htatute, unci because there was no expre~s
statement thal the omission wa.-s intended to preclude private remedies.
But the respondent concedes that t.he language of § 214 was probably
narrowed in view of the absence from the Advisers Act of uny exprcs::;
provi::;ion for a private cau:;e of action for damagr:;. We agree, but find
the omis:;ion inconsistrnt more generally with an intent on the part of
Congress to make sueh n remedy available.
1 8 Congress amended the Investment Ccmpany Act in 1970 to create
o. narrowly circumscribed right of action for damage:; against. investment
adviser:; to registered investment companies. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub.
L. 91-547, 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U.S. C. § 80a-35 (b). While subEequent
lrgislation can disclose little or nothing of the intent of Congress in
euacting earlier laws, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. supra,
375 U. S., at 199-200, the 1970 amendment~; to the companion Act is
another clear indicaticn that Congres::; knew how to confer a private right
of action when it wished to rlo so.
In 1975 the Commi~;sion ~ubmitted a proposal to Congress that would
have amended § 214 to extend juri~diction, without regard to the amount
in controversy , to "actions a.t law" under the Act. See S. 2849, 94th
Cong., 2d Sel:i:s., § 6 (1976) . The Commil:i:;ion was of the view that the
amendment also would confirm the existence of a private right of action
to rnforoo the Act's sub;:;tantive provision::;. See Hearings on S. 2849
before thr Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2 Se~s ., 17 ; Hearings on
H. R. 12981 and H. R. 13737 before the Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Committee on lnter:;tate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Ses~. , 36-37. The Senate Committee reported
favorably on the provision as proposed by the Commis:sion, but the bill
'<lid not come to a vote in either House.
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the fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated to state
law. We rejected the same contentions last Term in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, where it was argued that these
factors standing alone justified the implication of a private
right of action under § 17 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. We said in that case:
"It is true that in Cort v. Ash, supra, the Court set forth
four factors that it considered "relevant" in determining
whethE>r a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not decide
that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to
crea.tE', either expressly or by implication, a private cause
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative
history, and its purpose, see 422 U. S., at 78-are ones
traditionally reliE>d upon in determining legislative inU. S., at - , - .
tent." The statute in Touche Ross by its terms neither granted
private rights to the members of any identifiable class, nor
proscribed any conduct as unlawful. To·uche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, supra, at - . In those circumstances it was
evident to the Court that no private remedy was available.
Rection 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended
to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited.
But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect
advisers' clients does not require the implication of a private
cause of action for damages on their behalf. 'L'o·uche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at - ; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at - ; Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbo·ur, S'upra, at 421. The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy.
Having answered that question in the negative, our iuquiry
is at an end.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that there
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exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an investment advisers contract,
but that the Act confers no other private causes of action,
legal or equitable." Accordingly, the judgmer1t of the Court
of Appeals is affirrned in part and reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

11 Where re,.;ei~sion is awardrcl, the n•. cinclin~ party mny of rourRe l1aYe
restitution of the ron:;iderntion given under the rontra<'t, It's~ any value
conferred by the other party. }lp;;tit.ut.ion would not, howeYcr, n1rlnde
compC'nsation for any diminution in the value of t lw l'<'~eindin~ party':<"
investment. alle~rd to havr rr~nltt:>d from the adviH<'r·~ af'tion or mart ion
Sueh relief rould provide h.' · indirPrt ion t lw Pqn iv:lll•n t of :1 pri,·n tp dnm:tg;<'
remPdy that we ha\'(' ron<'lnded C'ongre~s did lHll f•onfl'l
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1645
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA), et al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
v.
Harry Lewis.
[October - , 1979]
Mn. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80
et seq., was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress 1ad
found to exist in the investment advisers industry. The
question in this case is whether that Act creates a pr vate
cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of pe ous
aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it.
The respondent, a shareholder of petitioner Mortgage Tru
of America (Trust), brought this suit in a federal district
court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a
class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders. Named as
defendants were the Trust, several individual trustees, the
Trust's investment advise!', Transamerica Mortgage Advisers,
Inc. (TAMA), and two corporations affiliated with TAMA,
Land Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), and Transamerica Corporation (Transamerica), all of which are petitioners in this
case.1
1 Hereinafter "the petitioners" refers to the petitioners other than the
Trust. The Trust is a real e!:itate investment trust within the meaning of
§§ 856-858 of the Internitl Revenue Code. TAMA, in addition to advi::;ing the Tru:s1, mnnaged it~ day-to-day OJlPration~ . Tram;amerira i::; 1hr
sponf<or of the Trust and the parent of Land Capital. Land Capital isthe parent of TAMA, through a subsidiary, and sold the Trust its initial
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The respondent's complaint alleged that the petitioners in
the course of advising or managing the Trust had been guilty
of various frauds and breaches of fiduciary duty. The complaint set out three causes of action, each said to arise under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 2 ·The first alleged that
the advisory contract between TAMA and the Trust was
unlawful because TAMA and Transamerica were not registered under the Act and because the contract had provided
for grossly excessive compensation. ·The second alleged that
the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty to the Trust by
causing it to purchase securities of inferior quality from Land
Capital. ·The third alleged that the petitioners had misappropriated profitable investment opportunities for the benefit
of other companies affiliated with Transamerica. The complaint sought injunctive relief to restrain further performance
of the advisory contract, rescission of the contract, restitution
of fees and other considerations paid by the Trust, an accounting of illegal profits, and an award of damages.
The trial court ruled that the Investment Advisers Act con-.
fers no private right of action, and accordingly dismissed the
complaint. 3 The Court of Appeals reversed, 575 F. 2d 237,
holding that "implication of a private right of action forinjunctive relief and damages in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting
the legislation." !d., at 239.4 We granted certiorari to conportfolio of investments. Several of the individual trustees were at the
time of suit affiliated with TAMA, Transamerica, or other subsidiaries of
Tran:samcrica.
2 Each cause of action was stated as a derivative shareholder's claim
and restated as a shareholders class claim.
8 The pertinent orders of the District Court are unreported.
4 The District Court was of the view that it was without subject-matter·
juri:;dirtion of the respondent 'H suit. The Court of Appeals recharacterized the Dit;trict Court's order dismissing the suit as properly ba:sed upon
the respondent's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) (6), noting that the res~ndent's suit wa ;
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sider the important federal question presented. - U. S . (1978).
The Investment Advisers Act nowhere expressly provides
for a private cause of action. The only provision of the Act
that authorizes any suits to enforce the duties or obligations
created by it is § 209, which permits the Securities Exchange
Commission (Commission) to bring suit in a federal district
court to enjoin violations of the Act or the rules promulgated
under it." The argument is made, however, that the clients
apparently within the District Court's general federal-qurstion jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C.§ 1331. 575 F. 2d, at 239, n. 2.
The Court of Appeals in thi:; cnse followed the Courts of Appeab for the
Fifth and Second Circuits, which also have held that private cau::>es of
action may be maintnined under the Act. See Wilsan v. First Houston
Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977) .
~Section 209, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9, provide:; in part as follows :
"(e) Whenever it 8hall appear to the Commission that any perb'ou
has engaged, is ,engaged, or i:; about 1o engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of <UlY provision of this :;ubchapter, or of any rule,
regulation, or order hereunder, or that any person has aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, or procured, is aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, or procuring, or is about to aid, abet, counsel,
comm:.w d, induce, or procmX' such :~ \'iolation, it, may iu its di:;cretiou
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, or the
proper United States court of any Territory or other place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practice>; and to
enforce compliance with this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order
hereunder. Upon a showing that such person has engaged, is engaged, or
i::; about to engage in any such act or practioo, or in aiding, abetting, counseling. commanding, induciug, or procuring any such act or practice, a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or rest raining order shall be
granted without bond. The Commission mny transmit such evidence as
may be available concerning any violation of the provisions of this subchapter, or of any mle, regulation, or order thereunder, to the Attorney
General, who, in hi~> discretion, may institute the appropriate criminal
procedings under this subchapter."
The language in § 209 (e) that authorizes the Commission to obtain an
injunction again::>t persons "aiding, abetting, . .. or procuring" violations
of the Act wns added to the statute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887.
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of investment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the
Act and that courts should therefore imply a private cause of
action in their favor. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
U. S. - , - ; Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78; J. I. Case v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, - .
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action,
either expressly or by implication , is basically a matter of
statutory construction. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U. S. - , - ; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, U. S., at - ; see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458
(hereinafter Amtrak). While some opinions of the Court
have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies
thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e. g.,
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S., at-; Cannon v.
University of Chicago, U. S., a t - . We accept this as
the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues
presented by the case before us.
Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute
itself. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S., a t - ;
Carmon v. University of Ch,i cago,- U. S., a t - ; Santa Fe
Indust., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 24. It is asserted that the creation
of a private right of action can fairly be inferred from the,
language of two sections of the Act. The first is § 206, which
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud .. . or to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,"
or to engage in specified transactions with clients without,
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making required disclosures. 6 The second is § 215, which provides that contracts whose formation or performance would
violate the Act "shall be void ... as regards the rights of"
the violator and knowing successors in interest. 7
6

Section 206, 15 U.S. C.§ SOb-6, read:; a!S follows:
"§ SOb-6. Prohibited tnm!:lactiom; by inve!:ltment advi::;ers.
"It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by u::;e of the mails
or nny means or instrumentality of inter::;tate commerce, directly or
indirectly" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prospective client;
"(2) to engage in any trnnsaction, practice, or course of bu::;ine~Ss which
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any chent or pro!Spective client;
"(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any
security to or purchase any security from a rlient, or acting as broker for
a person other than such client, knowingly to effect any salP or purchase
of any security for the account of ::;uch client, without disclosing to such
client in writing before the completion of such transaction the capacity in
which he i:; acting and obtaining the con::;ent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions of this paragraph shal not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer i8
not acting as an inve:;tment adviser in relation to such tram;action;
" ( 4) to engage in any act, practice, or cour::;e of bu:;ineSli which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commi:;:;ion shall, for the purpo:;es
of thi:; paragraph ( 4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means rea::;onably designed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses
of business at> are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
Section 206 (4) was added to the ::;tatute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. At that
Lime Congress also extended the provision» of § 206 to all investment
adviser.o, whether or not such advi~er:; were required to regi:ster under
§ 203 of the Act. Ibid.
1 Section 2-1-5, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-15, read:s in part as follows:
"§ SOb-15. Validity of contracts
"(b) EvPry contract made iu violation of any provision of this subchapter
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relation~hip or practice in violation of any provision of this :subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, ~hall be void (1) as regards the rights of any
person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, regulation, or order,
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It is apparent that the two sections were intended to benefit
the clients of investment advisers, and, in the case of § 215,
the parties to advisory contracts as well. As we have previously recognized, § 206 establishes "federal fiduciary standards" to govern the conduct of investment advisers, Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S., at 471, n. 11; Burks v. Lasker,
U. S. - , - , n. 10; SEC v. Capital Ga'ins Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 191-192. Indeed, the Act's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations. See H. R. Rep. No.
2639, 76th Con g., 3d Sess., 28 ( 1940) ; S. Rep. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., 21 (1940); SEC, Report on Investment Trusts
and Investment Companies (Investment Counsel and Investment Advisory Services), H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d
Sess., 27-30 (1939). But whether Congress intended additionally that these provisions would be enforced through private litigation is a different question.
On this question the legislative history of the Act is entirely silent--a state of affairs not surprising when it is remembered that the Act concededly does not explicitly provide any
private remedies whatever. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, supra,- U. S., at-. But while the absence of
anything in the legislative history that indicates an intention
to confer any private right of action is hardly helpful to the
respondent, it does not automatically undermine his position. This Court has held that the failure of Congress
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy availU. S., at - .
able. Cannon v. University of Chicago, Such an intent may appear implicitly in the language or
shall have made or engaged in the performance of any such contract, aud
(2) a~:~ rrgttrdo; the rights of any pcr~on who, not being a party to such
contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge
of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of ~uch contract was in violation of any such provi~ion ."
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stfucture of the statute, or in the circumstances of its
enactment.
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory Ian ..
guage itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief
in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215
by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of vtlid ..
ness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the
very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforce.
ment of an investment advisers contract. But the legal consequences of voidness a.re typically not so limited. A per~on
with the power to avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a
court to have the contract rescinded and to obtain restitution
of consideration paid. See Deckert v. Independence Corp.,
311 U. S. 282. 289; Williston, Contracts, 3d edition, § 1525;
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th edition. §§ 881 and 1092.
And this Court has previously recognized that a comparable
provision, § 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U. S. C. § 77cc (b) , confers a "right to rescind" a contract void
under the criteria of the statute. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388. Moreover, the federal courts in general have viewed such language as implying an equitable cause
E. g., Kardon v.
of action for rescission or similar relief.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (DCED Pa.
1946); see III Loss, Securities Regulation 1758- 1759 (2d ed ..
1961). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U. S. 723, 735.
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress declared
in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the
customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including
the availability of a suit for rescission or for an injunction
against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution.8 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was
s One possibility, of course, is that Congress intended that claims ·u.nde't
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correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain an action
on behalf of the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers
contract. 9
We view quite differently, however, the respondent's claims
for damages and other monetary relief under § 206. Unlike
§ 215, § 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not in
terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability
to a private plaintiff is to be found, it must read it into the
Act. Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction
that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode,
it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v.
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See Amtrak, supra,
414 U. S., at 458; Securities Protection Investment Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 419; T. I. M ·. E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U. S. 464. Congress expressly provided both judicial and
administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206.
First, under ~ 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in
federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including,
of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by
§ 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons
who violate the Act, including§ 206. In view of these express
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206, it is
highly improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to
mention an intended private action." Cannon v. University
of Chicago,- U.S., a t - (PowEr. .L, J., dissenting) .
§ 215 would be rai::;ecl only in state court. But we decline to adopt such
an anomalous con~truction without some indication that Congress in fact
wi-;hed to remit the litigation of a federal right to the state courts.
9 Juri~diction of such suits would exist under § 214 which , though
referring in terms only to "suits in equity to enjoin violation::;," would
equally sustain actions where ::;imple declaratory relief or re::;cission issought.
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Even settled rules of statutory construction could yield, of
course, to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
Securities Protection Investor Corp . v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412,
419; Amtrak, supra, 414 U.S., at 458. But what evidence of
intent exists in this case, circumstantial though it be, weighs
against the implication of a private right of action for a monetary award in a case such as this. Under each of the securities
laws that preceded the Act here in question, and under the
Investment Company Act which was enacted as companion
legislation , Congress expressly authorized private suits for
damages in prescribed circumstances. 10 For example, Congress provided an express damage remedy for misrepresentations contained in an underwriter's registration statement in
§ 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and for certain materially misleading statements in § 18 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "Obviously, then , when Congress wished
to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to do so
and did so expressly." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, U. S., at 11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U. S., at 734 (1975); see Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458;
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U. S., at 471. The fa.e t
that it enacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here
at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling
to impose any potential monetary liability to a private suitor.
See Abrahamson v. Flechsner, 508 F. 2d, a t - (Gurfein , J.,
dissenting) .
The omission of any such potential remedy from the Act's
substantive provisions was paralleled in the jurisdictional secSee Securities Act of 1933, §§ J 1 and 12, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k and 771';
Securities ExchangE> Act of 1934, §§ 9 (e) , 16 (b), and 18, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 71i (e), 78p (b) , and 78r ; Public Utilit y Holding Company Act of
1935, §§ 16 (a) and 17 (b), 15 U. S. C. §§ 79p (a ) and 79q (b) ; Trust
IndenturE> Act of 1939, § 323 (a ) , 15 U. S. C. § 77www (a) ; Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 30 (f), 15 U.S. C.§ 80a-29 (f) .
10
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tion, § 214. 11 Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated
by reference a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, which gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liab·i lity or duty created by" the statute (emphasis added).
SeeS. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess .. 98 (introduced by Sen. Wag~
ner, Mar. 14, 1940); H. R. 8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 98 (introduced by Rep. Lea, Mar. 14, 1940). After hearings on the
bill in the Senate, representatives of the investment advisers
indus try and the staff of the Commission met to discuss the
bill, and certain changes were made. The language that was
enacted as § 214 first appeared in this compromise version of
the bill. See Confidential Committee Print, S. 3580, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., § 213. That version, and the version finally
enacted into law, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 214, both
omitted any references to "actions at law" or to "liability." J 2
tt Section 214, 15 U. S. C. § 801.>-14, provides:
"§ 80b-14. .Jurisdiction of offem;e~ and :;nits.
"The di::;trict courts of the Unit€<! State:; and the United State::; courts
of any Territory or other place ~ubject to the jurisdiction of the United
State:; ::;hall have juri:;diction of violation:; or thi::; subchu.pter or the rules,
regnlatious, or orders thereunder, and, concurrently with State and Tenitorial court:;, of all :suit:s in equity to enjoin any violation of thi:s subchapter or the rules, regulations, or order::; thereunder. Any criminal
proceeding may be brought in the di:strict wherein any act or tran::;action
con:stituting the violation occurred. Any :suit or action to enjoin any
violation of this ~ubchapter or rules, regulation::;, or order::; thereunder,
may be brought in any :such district or in the district wherein the defendant i::> an inhabitant or tran:sact::; busines:s, and proces::; in such cases
may be served in any di:;trict of which the defendant i:; an inhabitant or·
transacts bu:;iness or wherever the defendant may be found. JudgmPnts
and decree:; :;o rendered shall be :;ubject to review as provided in :-;ection:;
225 aud 347 of Title 28, and section 7, a:s ameuded, of the Act entitled
'An Act to e:;tabli:;h a court of appealtj for the Di:;trict of Columbia,'
approved February 9, 1893. No cost:; :shall be as:;e:;:sed for or agam:;t
the Commil:ision in any proceeding under thi:; subchapter brought by or
againHt the Commi::;::;ion iu uny court."
l 2 The respondent argues that the omi:;:>ion of any reference in § 214
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The unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a jurisdic~
tional provision is, of course, not determinative of whether a
private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evidence
that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action
for anything beyond limited equitable reliefY
Relying on the factors identified in Cart v. Ash, supra, the
respondent and the Commission, as amicus curiae, argue that
our inquiry iu this case cannot stop with the intent of Con~
gress, but must consider the utility of a private remedy, and
to "actions at law" i~ without relevance becau~e juri:sdiction over such
cases as thi:s would often exist under 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general
fedcral-que:stion juri~diction :otatute, and because there wa:; no expresl!!
statement that the omission was intended to preclude private remedie;;.
But the re:spondent concedes that the language of § 214 was probably
narrowed in view of the absence from the Advisers Act of any express
provil:lion for a private cau::;e of action for damage:;. We agree, but find
the omis:sion inconsistent more generally with an intent on the part of
Congress to make such a remedy available.
18 Congress amended the Investment Ccrnpm1y Act in 1970 to create
:J, narrowly cireumscribed right of action for damages again:;t inve:stment
adviserl:l to registered investment companies. Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub.
L. 91-547, 20, 84 Stat. 1428, 15 U. S. C. § 80a.-35 (b). While subsequent
legi:slation can di:scloso little or nothing of the intent of Congre~1:1 in
euacting earlier law,;, ~ee SEC v. Capital Gains Resem·ch Bureau, supra,
375 U. S., a.t 199-200, the 1970 amendments to the companion Act is
another clear indication that Congres::~ knew how to confer a private right
of action when it wi~hed to do so.
In 1975 the Commi~>~ion ~ubmittf'd a proposal to Congre~s that would
ha.ve amended § 214 to extend jurisdiction, without regard to the umount
in controver:sy, to "action~ at law" under the Act. See S. 2849, 94th
Cong. , 2d Se;;l:l., § 6 (1976). The Commission was of the view that the
amendment also would confirm the existence of a private right of uction
to f'nforoo the Act's sub:;tantive provisions. See Hearings on S. 2849
before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2 Ses~., 17 ; Hearings on
H. R. 12981 and H . R. 13737 before the Subcommittee on Con~umer
Protection and .Finance of the Hou:;e Committee on Interl:ltate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 36-37. The Senate Committee reported
favorably on the provision as propo~ed by the Commi:s~ion, but the bill
relict not come to a vote in either House.
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the fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated to state
law. We rejected the same contentions last Term in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, where it was argued that these
factors standing alone justified the implication of a private
right of action under § 17 (a.) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. We said in that case :
"It is true that in Cort v. Ash, supra, the Court set forth
four factors that it considered "relevant'' in determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not decide
that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative
history, and its purpose, see 422 U. S., at 78-are ones
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent." U. S., at - , - .
The statute in Touche Ross by its terms neither granted
private rights to the members of any identifiablP class, nor
proscribed any conduct as unlawful. Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, supra, at - . In those circumstances it was
evident to the Court that no private remedy was available.
Section 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended
to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited.
But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect
advisers' clients does not require the implicatio11 of a private
cause of action for damages on their behalf. Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, supra, 442 U. S., at - ; Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at - ; Securities Investor Protect'ion
Corp. v. Barbour, supra, at 421. The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy.
Having answered that question in the negative, our inquiry
is at an end.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that there
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exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an investment advisers contract,
but that the Act confers no other private causes of action,
legal or equitable. 14 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the
case is remanded to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It ·is so ordered.

14 Where rescission is awarded, the rescinding party ma.y of course haverestitut.jon of the consideration given under the contract, less any value
conferred by the other party. Restitution would not, however, include
compensation for any diminution in the value of the rescinding party's
investment. alleged to have resulted from the adviser's artion or inaction.
Such relief could provide by indirection the equivalent of a private damage
remedy that we have concluded Congress did not. confer.
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actions for rescission of investment advisers contracts. In
reaching this decision, the Court departs from established ~tie
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cannot be reconciled with our decisions recognizing implied ~e?tfVI~ ~
private actions for damages under securities laws with substantially the same li!-nguage as the Act. 1 By resurrecting ~~;P

?'to
~~~ ~

The provisions of § 206 of the TnvrF<tmrnt Advisers Ac1 of 1940, 15
U. S. C. § 80b-6, are substantially similar to § 10 (b) of the Srcurities
Exchange Act of 19a4, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and llule lOb-5, 17 CFR
§ 240.10b-5, both of which havP bern !wid to crPate privatE' rights of action
for which damages may be recoverPd. Superintendent of lns·u mnce v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n. 9 (1971); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stm·es, 421 U. S. 72:~, no (1975). ThP provisions of
§ 215 (b) of the Act, 15 U . S. C. § 80b-15, are substantially similar to
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distinctions between legal and equitable relief, the Court
reaches a result that, as all parties to this litigation agree, can
only be considered anomalous.

This Court has long recognized that private rights of action
do not require express statutory authorization. Texas &
Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1916); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S.
210 (1944). 2 The preferred approach for determi11ing whether
a private right of action should be implied from a federal
statute was outlined in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975).
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, U. S. - - (1979).
Four factors were thought relevant; 9 and although subsequent
other provisions in the Secui'ities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.

§ 78cc (b).
2 Rigsby marked the first time this Court implied a private right of
action. There the Court recognized that implied rights of action were not
novel nnd had been a feature of the not infrequent common law. 1'exas &
Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 lT. S. 33, 39-40 (1916) (citing Couch v. Steel,
118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q. B. 1854)) . See Canrwn v. Unive1·sity of
Chicago,- U.S.-,-, n. 10.
8 "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,' 'l'exas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 3!}
(1916) (emphasis supplird)-that is, does thr statutr create a federal
right in favor of the plaiutiff? Second, is thrrc any indication of legislative intent, rxplicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one'? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn'n
of Raili'Oad Passengers. 414 U.S. 453, 458, 4()0 (1974) (Amtrak). Third,
is it consistent with the underlying purpose~ of the legislative scheme to
imply such a rrmedy for thE' plaintiff? See, e. g., Arntmk, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975);
Calhoon v. Harvey, 879 U. S. 1:34 (1964) . And finally, is the cau~e of
action one traditionally relegated lo state law. in an urea basically the
concern of the States, so that it would br inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on fedrral law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S.
647, (152 (19()3) ; cf. J. f. Case Co. v. Bomk. :177 U.S. 426, 434 (1964);
Biveus v. Six Unknown Jt'ederai Narcotics Agents, 403 U . S. 388, 394-395-
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decisions have indicated that the implication of a private right
of action "is limited solely to determining whether Congress
intended to create the private right of action," Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, - U. S. --, ( 1979), these four factors are
"the criteria through which this intent could be discerned."
(1979). Proper appli~
Davis v. Passman, - - U. S. - , cation of the factors outlined in Cort clearly indicates that
§ 206 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § SOb-6, creates a private right
of action.

II
In determining whether respondent can assert a private
right of action under the Act, "the threshold question under
Cart is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit. of a
special class of which the plaintiff is a member." Cannon v.
University of Chicago, supm, at-. The instant action was
brought by respondent as both a derivative action on behalf
of Mortgage Trust of America and a class action on behalf
of Mortgage Trust's shareholders. Respondent alleged that
Mortgage Trust had retained Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. (TAMA) as its investment adviser and that
violations of the Act by TAMA had injured the client corporation. Thus the question under Cort is whether the Act
was enacted for the special benefit of clients of investment
aqvisers.
The Court concedes that the language and legislative history of § 206 leave no doubt that it was "intended to benefit
the clients of investment advisers," ante, at - , as we have
previously r~cognized. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-192 (1963); Santa F'e Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 471, n. 11 (1977).4 Because
(1971); icl., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in .Juclgmrnt)." Cm·t v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 7R (1975) .
·1 Tlw statu tor~· languagr elra rl~· indicates that thr intrnd<>cl brnrfieinrir~
of the Act arc t hr rlirnt,.; of invr~tm!'lll ndvi,.;<>r~'<. Sretion 206 makrs it
unlawf~1l for any inYe~tmcnl nclviser '' (1) to <>tnploy any clcviec, sehcmc,
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respondent's claims were brought on behalf of a member of
the class the Act was designed to benefit, i. e., the clients of
investment advisers, the first prong 0f the Cart test is satisfied
in this case.

III
The second inquiry under the Cart approach is whether there
is evidence of an express or implicit legislative intent to negate
the claimed private rights of action. As the Court noted in
Cannon:
"the legislative history of a statute that does not expressly
create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally
silent or ambiguous on the question. Therefore, in situations such as the present one 'in which it is clear that
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it
is not necessary to show an intention to create a private
cause of action, although an· explicit purpose to deny
such cause of action would be controlling.' Cart, supra,
422 U. S.. at 82 (emphasis in original)." Cannon v ..
University of Chicago, supra, at--.
I find 110 such intent to foreclose private actions. Indeed,
the statutory language evinces an intent to create such actions. ~ In § 215 (b) of the Act Congress provided that conor artifice to defraud any clirnt or prospectivr client; (2) to engage in
any transaction, practice, or cour::>e of busine:ss which oprrates as a ·fraud
or deceit upon any clirnt or prospective client" ; and (3) to engilge in
certain transactions with "a client" or ''for the account of such client,"
without making certain written disclosures "to such client" and "obtaining
the consent of the client to such transaction." Statements in the House
and Senate committee reports that accompanied the onginal legi:slation
reinforce the conclusion that the Act wa::> designed to protect investors
against fraudulent practices by investment advisers. See, e. g., H. R.
Rep . No. 2639, 76th Co11g., 3d Sess. , 28 (1940) ; S. Rep . No . 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sei:i:s., 21 ( 1940) .
~Abo, as the Court recognizei:i, the legislative hh;tory of the Act is
"entirely silent" on the question of private rights of action ; it neither ·
·explicitly nor implicitly indicate:> that Congre:ss intended to deny private
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tracts made in violation of any provision of the Act "shall be
void." As the Court recognizes, such a. provision clearly contemplates the existence of private rights under the Act.
Similar provisions in the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S. C.
§ 80a-46 (b), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78cc (b),· and the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U.S. C. § 79z (b), have been recognized as reflecting an intent
to create private rights of action to redress violations of substantive provisions of those acts. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F.
Supp. 207, 225-228 (SDNY), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 415 (CA2 1961);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (ED
Pa. 1946); F·ischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F. 2d 783,
787, n. 4 (CA2 1951); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 735 (1975); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142
F. 2d 422, 426-427 (CA2 1944).
The Court's conclusion that § 215, but not § 206, creates an
implied private right of action ignores the relationship of § 215
to the substantiYe provisions of the Act contained in § 206.
Like the jurisdictional provisions of a statute, § 215 "creates
no cause of action of its own force and effect; it impoEes no
liabilities." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at - -.
Section 215 merely specifies one consequence of a violation of
the substantive prohibitions of § 206. The practic11l necessity
of a private action to enforce 'this particular consequence of a
§ 206 violation suggests that Congress contemplated the use
of private actions to redress violations of § 206. It also indicaks that Congress did not intend the powers given to the
SEC to be the exclusive means for enforcement of the Act. 6
· damagr actions to clients victimized by their investment advisers. Every
court that has ron~idered thr question has co~e to this conclusion.
6 The Court concludes that brcaw;e the Act expressly provides for SEC
enforcement proceeclingl', Congre~s mu~t not have intended to create
private rights of action. This application of the oft-criticized maxim
expressio uniu,s est alterius ignore~' our rejrrtion of it in Co'rt v. Ash,.
422 U.S. 66, 82-83, n. 14 (1975), in the absence of specific support in the
legislati,·e qistory for the proposition that express statutory remedies are

-~
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The Court's holding that private litigants are restricted to
actions for contract rescission confuses the question whether a
cause of action exists with the question of the nature of relief
available in such an action. Last Term in Davis v. Passrnan,
- U . S . - , - , we recognized that "the question of whether
a litigant has a 'cause of action' is analytically distinct and
prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be
entitled to receive." Once it is recognized that a statute
creates an implied right of action, courts
have wide discretion
I
in fashioning available relief. Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 239 (1969) ("The existence of a
statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and
appropriate remedies."). As the Court stated in Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946), "where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to
sue for such invasion, federal court may use any ava.ilable
remedy to make good the wrong done." Thus, 'in the absence
of any contrary indication by Congress, courts may provide
private litigants exercising implied rights of action whatever
relief is consistent with the congressional purpose. J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 ( 1964); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.. S. 412, 424 (1975); cf.
11exas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, supra, at 39. The very decisions cited by the Court to support implication of an equitable
right of action from contract voidance provisions of a statute,
indicate that the relief available in such an action need not b~
·restricted to ~quitable relief. Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U. S. 282, 287-288 (1940); Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388 (1970) ("Monetary relief will, of
course, also be a possibility."); Kardon v. National Gypsurn
Co., supra, at 514 ("Such suits would include not only actions
to be exclu;,;ive. Moreover, the Court ignore;,; the fact that
ment J)Owers given the SEC under the Inve;,;tment Advi:;ers
tually idPntical to thot;e embodied in other securitie:; act:;
implied rights of action have been recognized. Abrahamson
568 F . -2d 862, 874, n . '19 (CA2 1977) .

the enforceAct are virunder which
v. Fleschner"'
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for rescission but also for money damages."). As the Court
recognized in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395,
399 0946), "where, as here, the equitable jurisdiction of the
court has properly been invoked for injunctive purposes, the
court has the power to decide all relevant matters in dispute
and to award complete relief even though the decree includes
that which might be conferred by a court of law." Thus if'
a private right of action exists under the Act, the relief available to private litigants may include f:\>H award of damages.
The Court concludes that the omission of the words "actions
at law" from the jurisdictional provisions of § 214 of the Act
and the failure of the Act to expressly authorize any private
actions for damages reflect congressional intent to deny private
actions for damages. Section 214 provides that federal district courts "shall have jurisdiction of violations of [the Act]"
and "of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation of" the Act.
15 U. S. C. § 80b-14. Although other federal securities acts·
have provisions expressly granting federal court jurisdiction
over "actions at law," the significance of this omission is
delphic · at best. While a previous draft of the bill that be-·
came the Investment Advisers Act incorporated by reference
the jurisdictiqnal provisions of the Investment Company Act
and the Public Utility Holding Company Act. there is no·
indication in the legislativ!:) history as to why this draft was ·
replaced with the language that became§ 214. 7 The only reference to the jurisdictional provisions of the Act is the statement in the House committee report that §§ 208-2.21 "contain
provisions comparable to those in [the Act]." H. R. Rep.
No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 30 ( 1940). As the Second Circuit concluded in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, supra, at 875:
7 Petitioner~' suggestion that thi;; change may have been the produet o{
industry p,essure is at odds with the legislative history. Indu~try objections to the original draft of the legi~latiun focused on matters unrelated
to the .iurisdirtioral provisions of the bill. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R
llep. No. 10065 before a Snbcommit1Pe of thP House Committe!' on IntPr:state and. Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., :3d Se:,;s., 9.2 ( 1940) .
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"There is not a shred of evidence ir1 the legislative history of
the Advisers Act to support the assertion that Congress inteutionally omited the reference to 'actions at law' in order to
preclude private actions by investors." See Wilson v. First
Houston Investment Corp., supra, a.t 1242. The Court recognizes that the more plausible explanation for the failure of
§ 214 exJ~ressly to include a reference to actions at law is that,
unlike other federal securities acts, the Act did not include
other provisions expressly authorizing private civil actions for
damages. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, supra, at 874; Bolger
v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp.
260, 264-265 (SDNY 1974). But as our cases indicate this
silence of the Act is not an automatic bar to private actions. 8
The fundamental problem with the Court's focus on § 214 is
that it attempts to discern congressional intent to deny a
priva.te cause of action from a jurisdictional, rather than a substantive, provision of the Act. Because § 214 is only a jurisdictional provision, "[i]t creates no cause of action of its own
force and effect; it imposes no liabilities." Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington , supra, at - . Since the source of implied
rights of action must be found "in the substantive provisions
of [the Act] which they seek to enforce, not in the j urisdictional provision." ibid., § 214's failure to refer to "actions at
law" does not indicate that private actions for damages are
unavailable under the Investment Advisers Act. The subjectmatter jurisdiction of the federal courts over respondent's
8 Congressional failure to make expresi:i provision for private actions for
damage::: is not surprising in light of Congress' traditional reliance on the
court::; to determine whether private rights of action should be implied and·
to award appropriat e relief. See Cannon v. University of Chicago. supra,
at (H~.<:HN<~ U II:\'1' , J., concurring) . Although recent decisions of the·
Court have contained admonih9n::; for Congres:; to legislate with greater
specificity in the future, ·id ., nt ..,......
(HEHNQUIS'l', J. , concurring) and (PowELL, J., dissenting) ; Touche·
Ross & Co . v. Redington, supra, at - , Congress cannot be faulted for·
(ailin~ tQ ~111t.iciJ~at e the;;e admonitions when the Act was enacted in 1940.

..
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action is unquestioned, regardless of how § 214 is interpreted,
·because jurisdiction is provided by the "arising under" clause
of 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Cf. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, supra,
at 880, n. 5 (Gurfein, J .. dissenting). Where federal courts
have jurisdictiou over actions to redress violations of federal
statutory rights, relief canuot not be denied simply because
Congress did not expressly provide for independent jurisdiction under the statute creating the federal rights. 0
If Congres;; provided no indirat ion oJ any intent to deny private rights
of action when § 214 wa~ eunct<•d, the subsequent failure of Congre::;s to
amend § 214 likewi::;e offers none. The 1960 amendment::; to the Invest·meut Adviser~ Act expanded 1he scope of § 206 and ::;treugthened the
authorit~· of thr SEC. Pub. L. N'o. 86--750 (1960). The::;e amendments
were not addrrs::;ed to the privatf' right of action que::;tion, nor is there any
indication that Congre;;;s con~>iderecl the question when the amendments
·were pas;;ed. Moreovrr, a;; the Court has noted 111 reviewing. the legislative hi~tor~· of the Inve:shnent Advisers Act on a prior occasion: "the
intent of Congress mu:st be culled from the evrnt::; surrounding the passage of thr 1940 legislation. 'LO]J}inions attributed to a Congre::;::; twenty
year~ after thr event cannot be con::;idered evidence of the intent of the
Congres;; of 1940.'" SEC v. Capital Gains ReseaTch BuTeau, inc., 375
U.S. 180, 199-200 (1963) .
ThiR admonition applies with equal force with re::;pect to the 1970
amendment~ to the A('t. Although the 1970 amendments were part of
legi;:;lation that created a new private right of action under the Investment
Company Act, "it would be odd to infer from Congre::;s' actions concerning
the newly crrated provisions of [a companion act] any intrntion regarding·
the enforc<•mPnt of a long-exi::;ting statute." CoTt v. Ash, s·upra, 422 U. S.,
at 83, n . H . Moreover, the committee reports accompanymg the 1970
amendments rlearly indicatt'd that the provision of express right::; of Hction
WH::i llot intended to affect the availability of implied right::; of action elsewherr. H. R. Rep. No. 91-1:382, 91::;1 Cong. , 2d Ses::;., 38 (1970); S. Rep.
No . 91-184, 91st Cong., hit Srs~., 16 (1969) .
Tlw failure of Congre~:s clunug its 1976 and 1977 ::;c:ssion::; to adopt an
SEC propo::;a] to add thP word:s "actions at law" to § 214 of the Act abo
dors not. foreclo::;e a privatr enforeem<'nt. The propo::;a], which wa::; favor-·
ably reported on by a Senatr committe<', S. Rep. No. 94-910, 94th Cong.,
2cl Se:;~. (H.J7G), wa" intended only to coufirm the exbtence of an implied
right of action aud not to create one. Lewis v. 'l'ransarnenca Corp., supm,
~_~, 2S8, \l. I , Tfw faiht.rc of Congre:s::; to enact legi,.;lation ts not alway:'i a.
9
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IV
The third portion of the Cart standard reqmre:s eunsiJeratiOJl of the compatibility of a private right of action with the
legislativP schemf'.10 While a private remedy will not be implied to thC' frustration of the legislativf' purpose. ""·hen that
remedy is necessary or at least helpful to tlw accom plish11wn t
of the sta.tutory purpose. the Court is decidedly reeeptivr to its
implication under the statute." Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, a t -.
'The purposC's of tlw Act have been reviewed Pxtensively by
the Court in SEC v. Crtpital Gains Research Bw·eau, Inc.,
supra. A mPticulous review of the legislative history convinced thP Court that tlw purpose of the Act was "to prevent
fraudulPrlt pmcticPs by investment advisers." ld., at 195.
The Court concluded that "Congress intended the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds.' not technically and restrictively, but flpxibly to pffectuatc its remedial
purposPs." ld., at 195 (footnote omitted).
Implication of a private right of action for damages unquPstionably would be not only consistent with the legislative
goal of preventing fraudulent practices by investment advisers,
but also essential to its achiPvement. While the Act empowers
the SEC to takf' action to seek equitable relief to prevent
offending investment advisers from engaging in future violat•cliabl(' Jl;llirl<' to

legi~Iat ivr

inlrnt. 7?1'rl Lwu Bmadcasting Co. v. FCC, !305

U. R. :~m. :182, n. 1l (Hl60); Fooarty v. United Statl's, 340 ll. S. R, 13-14
(1950) . It iH a totall.v inadPquate guidr whrn, as brr<', Cougrr~~ ma~· have
dcemrd t IH' propo~cd Jegi~lation unnercs ·ary, givrn the adf'(fU:lry of PXI:>l-

to ~uppor1 an implied right of action.
The Court Ignores thr third and fomt h prong8 of tlw Cort te~[ . on the
ground that tiH'." wrr<' 1gnorrd iu Touche Ross & Co. v. Hedington, U. R. - . HowrvN, i11 '!'our· he Russ I he Court Jound II unnt<·e:;:;Hry to
con,.;ider thP~C' fador~ onl~· brrau::<<' the olhPr portion~ of tlw Curt ::<landard
could nol b<' ~uti~fird. By routra~t. the Court lwrc ('011('ludc~ that at
lcu~L lhc first part of the Co1't test is i'ltti~fied

ing
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tions, 11 in the absence of a private right of action for damages,
victimized clients have little hope of obtaining redress for their
IDJUries. Like the statute in Cannon, the Act does not assure
that the members of the class it benefits are able "to activate
and participate in the administrative process contemplated by
the statut~." Cannon v. U11iversity of Chicago, supra, l:tt - ,
n. 41. Moreover, the SEC c~,nclidly admits that, given the
tremendous growth of the investme11t advisory industry, the
magnitude of the enforcement problem exceeds the Commission's limited examination 1 apd enforcement ca.pabilities.12
The Commission maintains that private litigation therefore is
a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement activity. Ul1der
the circumstances of this case, this position seems UI'lassailable. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, at 432; Cannon v.
University of Chicago, supra, a t -.

v
The fin~l consideration under the Cort analysis is whether
the subject matter of the cause of action has been so trauition~tllY relegated to state law as to make it imwpropriate to
infer a federal cause of action. Regulation of the activities of
investment advisers has not been a tra<litional state concern.
J.l Sre, e. (f .. § 209 (P) of thr Act, 15 U . S. C. § 80b-9 (t:>) (authorizing
ihe SEC to E<eek injunctive relief against violation~ of the Act) : § 203 (c),
15 U. S. C. § 20b-3 (e) (empowering the SEC to rf'voke the registratwn
of investmf'nL adviRf'rR) .
1 2 A~ of Decrmb<>r 31, 19711, a total of 5,385 inwshneni advisers were
registered with thr s~c. The Commi:s:sion f'i'itimatt'S that for the fi:scal
year emhng Octobrr :30, 1980. more than $200 billion in assPt:s will be .
under advisement h~· rf'gi~tered invt'Stmrui advi~rrs. (SEC Brief, at
32-33). In lUi'i, tht' SEC wa~ able to conduct only 459 in~pPction:s of
im'('stment advi~er~. SEC, 43d Annual Report 2:34 (1979) . As tlw Coqrt
recognized in Cannon. in mnny car:H'~' the enforcerrlE'nt agency · may be
unable to invr~iigate meritorion~ private complnintH, and rven when the
few invc~tigation,; do uncover vwlation,., tl1r privatf' v1ctim:s of tlw viol'a·
tions need lwt be included in the relief. Cannon v. University of ,Chicago,
sttpra, at - , n, 41.
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During the Senate h~arings preceding enactment of the Act,
Congress was informed that only six States had enacted legislatiOI'l to regulate investment advisers. Hearings on S. 3580
before a Subcommittee of the Sen~tte Committee on Banking
and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 996-10017 (1940). Most
of the state statutes subsequeptly enacted have been patterned after the federal legislation. See Note, Private Causes
'of Action Under Section 206 of the Investmeut Advisers Act,
74 Mich. L. Rev. 308,' 324 (1975).
Althou~h some practices proscribed by the Act undoubtedly
would have been actionable in common-law actions for fraud,
"Congress iutended the Investment Advisers Act to establish
federal fiducit~-ry standards for investment advisers." Sa:nta
Fe Indu~tries, Inc. v. Green, mpra, at 471, n. 11; SEC v.
Capital Gains 'f?,esearch Bureau, supra, at 191-192. While
state law may be applied to parties subject to the Act, "as
long as private causes of action are available in federal courts
for violations of the federal statutes, [the] enforcement problem is obviated." Burks v. Lasker, supra, - U. A.-,-,
n. 6 (1979) ,

VI
Each qf the Cort factors point toward implication of a private cau e of action +n favor of clients defrauded by investment advisers in violation of the Act. The Act was enacted
for the special benefit of clients of investment advisers and
there is no indication of any legislative intent to deny such a
cause of ftCtion, which would be consistent with the legisl~:~-tive
scherne governing an area not traditionally relegated to state
law. Under these circumstances an implied private right of
action for damages should be recognized.
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Justice Powell / concurring.
As I view the Court's opinion to be compatible with my

dissent
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University of Chicago,

(ante l at 8, 9), I join the Court's opinion.
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PowELL, concurring.

As [ view the Court's opinion to be compatible with rny
dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, U, S , at --,
(ante) at 8, ~)) , J join the Court's opiuio11 .
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77-1645 - Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
My vote is to reverse.
I would not go so far as to
say we will never find a private right of action implicit
in a statute, but I think the time has come that in this
area of legislation Congress should take the
responsibility for affirmative clarification.
Regards,

~')

1 a ocr 1978

F~LE COP'f
Pl£ASE RETURN
TO FILE

1st DRAJi'T

SUPREME COURT 'OF 'fHE UNITED STATES
TRANSAMERICA MORTGAGE ADVISORS, INC.
(TAMA) ET AL. v. HARRY LEWIS
ON PETI'l'ION FOH WRIT Of C~R'l;IORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FIRST HOUSTON INVESTMENT CORP.
JOHN M . WILSON

ET AL.

v.

QN PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORAlU TO TfiE UNITED STATES
CQU~T OF APPEALS J!'OH ',I'JiE J!'IFTH CIHCUIT
Ot> .

77-1645 aml 77-1717. Decided October-, 1978

MR. JusTICE PO'fELL, dissenting.
These cases present the question whether § 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Act), 15 U.S. C.§ 80b-6,
gives customers asserting fraud a private cause of action
against an investment compal1y 1111d its adviser. As it did last
Term in Fleschner v. Abrahamson,- U. S. - , 46 U. S. L. W.
3710 (May 15, 1978), the Court today declines a,n opportunity
to decide this question . The Act contains no provision authorizing private suits. and whether authority to sue may be
inferred has caused sharp disagreement withi11 the courts of
appeals. ,
The respondeut in No. 77-1645 is a shareholder of the
Mortgage Trust ~ -AmBrica (MTA), a real es~ate investment tru~t under l. R. C. §~ 856-858. He brought suit
against MTA and various companies and individuals associated with MTA (the petitiouers), alleging that the petitioners
had participated in a fraud11lent scheme under which .MTA
was organized and opera_!!tcl toJb.,t.!!~age ..£! !!s adviser and
parent ~ to the detriment of MTA's i11vestors. Each qf the
cumplai11t's six c~tuses of action purported to be based on § 206
of the Act, which makes it illegal for a11 mvestment adviser
covered by the Act to "engage in ai~Y transaction, pnitctice, ' or
course of busjness which operates as a fraud or deceit upon

'
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any client or prospectiw client.'' Jurisdiction was invoked
under ~ 214 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ 80b-14. which gives
federal c~rts jurisdiction "of violations of this subchapter or
the rules, regula,tions. or orders thereu11der, and ... of all suits
in equity to enjoin any violation of this s4bchapter . . . ."
The District Court for the ~orttwrn District of California
dismissed the respondent's suit. ruling that ~ 206 of the Act
does not afford investors such as the respondent a private
cause of action against an investment company. The Court
of Appeals for the Kinth Circuit reversed, stating simply that
it had reviewed the question and agreed with the Second and
Fifth Circuits that ~ 206 gives rise to a privatP cause of actio11.
See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 862 ( 1977). cert.
demed, U. S. - . 46 U. S. L. W. 3710 (May 15. 1978);
Wilson \', Fir8t Housto11 Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235
(CA5 1978), cert. demed this day. No. 77-1717. One judge
dissented from the court's decision. stating that he also had
revwwed the questwn and sided with the dissent in
A braham son.
The respondent in ~o. 77-1717 is an i11dividual who entrusted his stock portfolio. worth $104.358.
the m~nt
of ~·st Houston Invrstment Company and
three of Jts employees). Within 18 months. First Houston
had transformed the portfolio through ~) trl!..,sivh tradinf into
a list of stocks worth slightly over $5,000. T e respondent
brought suit against the petitioners asserting, inter alia, that
they had violated ~ 206 of thP Act by misrepresenting First
Houston 's method of operations.
The District Court for the Western District of Texas
dismissed the respo11dent's claim undN ~ 206. but the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. After examining the
requirements this Court has set down for implying private
causes of action, see Ptper v. Chris-Craft Industr-ies, Inc., 43G
F . ~. 1 (1977). the court cone] uded tha.t ~ 206 gives rise to a
private actiOJI for damagrs. In so ruling. the court reliecf
heavily upo11 the ~econd Circuit's opinioiJ ill Abrahamson v.
l!'l'eSJ:.·/jn~r
One member. OJf the pa.nel Uiss<et'lted from the Fifth

to

''~~-~-~~.---,

"'
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Circuit's ruling, arguing th~:~.t the ·12urpose of the Act was to
allow Congress to gather the information necessary for it to
decide whether it should legislate further concerning abuses of
i1westment companies. 'J'~1Us, the dissent concluded that ~ 206
was not meant to provide a private cause of action for individ~
ual investors.
Recent decisions of this Court have reltffirmed that private
causes of actiqn will be inferred from seclirities statutes only
if such an inferepce is consistent with the language and history
of the statute a.n,d is nepessary to avoid subversion of Congress'
purpose in passing the statute. See, e. g., Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., ' 430 U. S. 1 (1977). If courts are to avo'id
stepping beyond the legislative boundaries set by Congress,
they must take care in extending damage liability under
statutes that do not create such liability explicitly. In the
words of Justice Frankfurter, "[a] t best this is sqbtle business,
calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere
rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of
legislation becomes legislation itself." Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 83 (1939). This danger i~ particqlarly
acqte with respect to § 206 of the Act, as Congress has
declined to proyide for rrivate dl).mage actionu lthough it
several times l'J.S reviewed a.n o erwise strengthened the
e~h~'lis'iiis okf the Acl 'See tlie~pinion of J ;;-dge
Gurfein, concurrmg an lSSenting in Abrahdmson v. Fleschner,
568 F. 2d 862, 883-884 (CA2 1977), an opinion that I find
quite persuasive.
Moreover, the j ~isdictio 9al. grant of the Act differs from
that of other securities acts in its reference only to "suits in
equity" ; other acts include as well a grant of jurisdiction
extending to "actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created [under the 4,ct]." Compare § 214 of the Act
with § 44 of the Investment Compauy Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C.
§' 80a-43.
Three Courts of Appeals now have considered whether ~ 206
of the Act creates a private action for damages against investment companies. In each case. the panel has been sharply

4
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divided in its resolution of the question, individual members
having drawn different inferences from the hwguage and legislative history of the Act. furthermore, the liability of investment companies to private damage suits under the Act is a
matter of considerable importance both to the companies and
to the public with whom they deal.
I would grant certiorari.

,-

JS

10/28/79

MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 77-1645, TAMA v. Lewis

I

have

reviewed

Mr.

Justice

Stewart's

circulated

opinion in this case. In its present form, the opinion contains

ambi~y.

one

On <€§:e

~

L[/rescission of the contract,
of illegal profits,

it

notes

that

restitution of

and damages.

plaintiffs

fees~n

seek

accounting

0~ it concludes

that section 215 allows a suit for rescission and restitution.
On

~

it holds that there exists a limited private

remedy to void a contract and "restore the parties to the status
quo."

I

assum e

that

the

opinion

would,

therefore,

allow

a

district court to enjoin further operation of the contract, and

2.

investment

advisor

Nevertheless,

return

all

fees

and

the opinion could be

the
more

fTT"1"--A-1A---1"-t1n s po i n t •

Yo~ view

---

should be
that

Mr.

~

Conference

Stewart's

for

reasons:

term

"recission"

used

~mount of the original
~ ~~~~jectively,
lessening
~
_ ~~

vy-

~

slightly

( 1)

the

-- - - comports
investment
properly
with
the

awarded

under

that

section 215.

Justice

two

was

---

permissible under

acceptable
A .tprr"'·

at

in

the

no monetary
I

believe a holding

different

return
common

section

215,

of

holding
fees

possibility

that

and

is
the

understanding
( 2)

fees

investmenf-:"an be computed
the

relief

the

easily and

damages

the guise of an equitable decree.

and

of

may

be

Therefore,

I

recommend that you join Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion once it is
clarified.
Mr.
solid.

Justice Sewart's analysis of the damages issue is

You may

wish

to

add

a

short

concurrence

joining

his

opinion and expressing the view that the outcome in this case is
consistent with your opinion in Cannon

v~

University of Chicago.

1-. (/.

.To: The Chief ut.r.
Mr Justice ennun
K.r. J ust ice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
X Mr. Justice PoHcll
Mr. Justice R~=>hnqui st
Mr. Justice St .wens

From: Mr. J ust ice Stewar t
Circulated : 2 9 OCT 19 9
Recirculated: _____________
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1645
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA), ct al.,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of Apv.
peals for the Ninth Circuit.
Harry Lewis.
[October -, 1979]

MR.

delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. ~ 80b-1
et seq., was enacted to deal with abuses that Congress had
found to exist in the i11vestmeut advisers industry. The
question in this case is whether that Act creates a private
cause of action for damages or other relief in favor of persons
aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it.
The respondent, a shareholder of petiti011er Mortgage Trust
of America (Trust), brought this suit in a federal district
court as a derivative action on behalf of the Trust and as a
class action on behalf of the Trust's shareholders. Named as
defeHdants were the Trust, several individual trustees, the
Trust's in vestment adviser, Transamerica Mortgage Advisers,
Inc. (TAMA), and two corporations affiliated with TAMA,
Land Capital, Inc. (Land Capital), and Transamerica Corporation (Transamf'rica), all of which are petitioners in this
case. 1
JusTICE STEWART

Hrrrinaftrr "the petitioner~" rdt•rs to the prtitionrrs other than the
Trust. The Tru~t i~ a real r~tate inv<:'~:<tment tru~t within tlw meaning of
§§ R5G-R58 of the Internal Hrvrnue Code. TA:MA, in additioJl to advi~
ing the Trust, mt{frjg<:'d it,~ day-to-clay oprrationR. Tran~america i;:: the
spon:;or of the Tru:;t and til(' parent of Land Capital. Land Capital is
the parenL of TAl\IA, through a ~ubHidiary, and sold the Trust it~ initla[
1

'

.
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The respondent's complaint alleged that the petitioners in
the course of advising or managing the Trust had been guilty
of various frauds ancl breaches of fiduciary duty. The complaint set out three causes of action, each said to aris<' under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 2 The first alleged that
the advisory contract between TAMA and the Trust was
unlawful because TAMA and Transamcrica were not registered under the Act and because the contract had provided
for grossly excessive compensation. The second alleged that
the petitioners breached their fiduciary duty to the Trust by
causing it to purchase securities of inferior quality from Land
Capital. The third alleged that the petitioners had misappropriated profitable investment opportunities for the benefit
of othrr con~nies affiliated with Transamerica. The complaint soughif% junctiv~ief to restrain further performance
of the advisory contrae~scission of the contrasb-.restitution] ~~ .
of fees and other considerations paid by the Tr ~n account.,v.~\
ing of illegal profits. and a11 award of damages.
The trial court rule(l that the Investment Advisers Act confers no private right of action, and accordingly dismissed the
eomplaint.a The C'ourt of Appeals reversed, 575 F. 2d 237,
holding that "implication of a private right of action for·
injunctive relief and damages in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in euacting
the legislation." ld., at 239. 1 We granted certiorari to conportfolio of inve~tmrntf'. Se,·rml of the individual tru:ster,.: were at the
time of suit affiliated witl1 TAMA, Transameriea, or other sub~:>idiarie:s of
Tran;,amc:>rira.
2 Each cause of action wa~ Htatrd as a derivative ~:>hareholder's claim
:mel restated as a sha rrholclers class claim.
3 The pc:>rtinrnt ordrr" of the Di:strict Court are unrt>portt>cl.
1 The Di~trict Court waH of the view thnt it was without subjeet-matter
]uri:sdirtion of the rP;;pondrnt'H suit. The Court of Appral~ rt>characterizPcl the Di~:<trict Comt's order tli:-;mi~sing the ~uit a,; properly ba>'\'d upou·
thr rrspondPnt's failure to ::;tatP a claim upon which relief can be granted,
Frd, Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b) (6), noting that the re:;pondeut':; suit was;

'1'7-1645--0PlNION
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sider the importaut federal question presented. - U. S . ( 1978).
The Investment Advisers Act nowhere expressly provides
for a private causP of action. The ouly provision of the Act
that authorit~es a11y suits to enforce the duties or obligations
created by it is § 209, which permits the i:iecurities Excha.nge
Commission (Con~issi;;;) to bring suit in a federal district
courtta enjoiu violations of the Act or the rules promulgated
under it." The argument is made, however, that the clients
HpJmrentl~·

within the Dititrict Court'~ g('llt'ral fedt'ral-que:;tion jurisdiction uudrr 28 U.S. C.§ 1:3;H . 575 F. 2d, at 2;39, n. 2.
The Court. of ApJlrab in thi:; ea.' e followed the Court~ of Appeal::; for the
F1fth and Second Circuit~, which al:;o have held that private' cau~e~ of
actiou may he maintaiuC'd undPr the Act. St'e Wilwn v. P.irst Houston
!twest'lfl ent Corp., 566 F . 2d 1235 (CA5 1971:1) ; Abrahamson v. Fil'sclm el',
568 F . 2d Rfi2 (CA2 1977) .
" Section 209, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9, provich•:; in pnrt n::; followti :
"(e) WhrnC'vcr it ;:hall appear to the Commiti~ion that auy prrtion
has Pngaged, i::: rugagPcl, or i~ about to rngagr in auy act or practice constituting a violation of any provi;;ion of thi ~ "ubchapter, or of au~· rule,
rq?;ulatiou, or ordrr hereunder, or that any per~on has ai(h•d , abt•tled,
coun~eled, commanded, indu!'ed, or proem·l•d, i::; aiding, ab<'lting, (·ounticlin~ , commandin~-t. inducing, or procming, or is about to aid , a bPI, counsel,
command, imlure , or Jll'Ol'tll'(' i<llth a violaliou, it ma~' in il~ cli~cretion
bring an adion .in the JlrOp<'r cli~trid !'ourt of the Unih·cl States, or the
projwr CnitPd Slal<'s court of any Tl'rritory or other plarr subject to the
juri~diction of the Fnited States, lo enjoin ,;ueh acts or practices and to
enforrr romplianrC' with this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order
hcrt'tmcler. Upon ~~ showin!!; that ,.;uch Jlf•r,.;on has engaged, is engaged, or
i::; about. to en!!;uge in an~· such act or praetiN', or in aiding, abetting, counseling , rommandiug, indueing, or pro(·uring any ::;uch act or practice. a perllWIH' llt or t!'mporary iujunetion or dec ree or re:;training order shall be
grnnlC'd without. bond . The Co nnui$~iou ma~' tran ~mit such evidence as
may be availalliP (·onct•ming any Yiolation of thr provi s ion ~ of thiti subchaptrr, or of any rule, regulation , or ordPr lh(•rP1lllclt'r, lo the Attorney
General, who, iu hi::; di,.;erction, may inslilule the appropriate criminal
proccding::; under thi~ , ub!'IH\]llt•r."
The languagl' in § 209 (c) that authorizrs the Commis,;ion to obtain an
injunction against JWI'i<on:; "aidi n~. ahettiug, ... or procuring'' violation,;
of the Act wa ::; addc·d lo the ;;tal utc in 1950. 74 Stat. 8137

'
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of investment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the
Act and that courts should ~erefore imply a private cause of
action in their favo,2- Sec Ca:mwn v. Uni~ersity of Chicag!!_,
-U.S. -,..L-~ Vort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 6G, 78; [ 1. Case v.
~ 377 U.S.
The question whetlwr a statute creates a cause of action,
either expressly or by implication, is basically a matter of
statutory construction. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

fie.

U. S. - , - ; Cannon v. University of Ch·icago, S'Upra, U. S., at - ; see National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458
(hereinafter Amtrak). While some opinions of the Court
have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies
thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e. g.,
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
rPmedy ass~ed, as our rpcent Clecisious have made clear.
V'Fouche Ross & Co. Y. Redinyton, 442 U.S., a t - ; Cannon v.
University of Chicago, - U. S., a t - . We accept this as
the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues
presenteu by the case before us.
Accordingly, we begin with the language of the statute
itself. Touche Ross & Vo. v. Redington, 442 U. S., at - ;
Ca11non "· University of Chicago,-- U.S., at--; Santa Fe
Indust., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472; Piper v. Chris-Craft
I-ndus., Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 24. It is asserted that the creation
of a private right of action cau fairly be inferred from the
language of two sections of the Act. The first is § 206, which
broadly proscribes fraudulent practices by investment advisers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or dPceit upon ally client or prospective client,"
or to engage in specified trausactioml with clients without,

77-1645-0PINION
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making required disclosures. 6 The second is § 215, which provides that contracts whose formation or performance would
violate the Act "shall be void . .. as regards the rights of"
the violator and knowing successors in interest.7
Section 206, 15 U.S. C.§ SOb-6, reads a~ follow~ :
"§ 80b-6. Prohibited tran~actions hy iuve~tmeut advisers.
"It shall be unlawful for any inve::;tmeut advi:;er, by Ui:ie of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of inter:;tate commerce, directly or
indirectly" (1) to employ any device, ~cheme, or artifice to defraud any client or
prOi:iJWctive client;
"(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or eour:se of business which
operate:; as a fraud or dPeeit upon any client or prospective client;
"(3) acting as principal for hi::> own account, knowingly to sell any
security to or purchase any :;erurity from a client, or acting as broker for
a person other than such clirnt, knowingly to effcet any sale or purchase
of any security for the account of i:iUC'h client, without di:;closing to sucl1
client in writing before the completion of such trani"action the capacity in
which he ii:i ac·ting and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibition:; of thi::; paragraph shal not apply to any transaction with a. customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is
not acting a.~ an inve::;tmeut advist•r in relation to ::;uch transaction ;
" ( 4) to engage in auy act, practice, or cour::;e of bu~iness which is fraudt\lent, deceptivr, or manipulative. The Commi~::;ion shall, for the purposes
of this paragraph (-l) b~r rule::; and regulations define, and prescribe
meam; rea ·omtbly designed to prevent., such acts, practices, and courses
of bu:<ines::; a::; arc fraudulent, deerptiv(', or manipulative."
Section 206 (4) was added to the ::;tatute in 1960. 74 Stat. 887. At that
time Congress also extended the provision::; of § 200 to all inve::;tment
advi~er:;, whethrr or not ::;uch aclvi:;er::; were re<.Juired to regi::;ter under
§ 203 of the Act. Ibid.
7 Section 2-1-5, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-15, read::; in part as follow :
"§ 80b--15. Validity of contracts
6

"(b) Every contract made in violation of any provi:;ion of this subchapter
and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which
involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relation::;hip or' practice in violation of an~· provi:.;ion of thi::; subchapter, or an~· rule, regula,tion, or order thereundrr, :;hall be void (1) a:; regard:; the right::; of any
person who, in vwlation of any such provi~ion , rule , regulation, or order,
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It is apparent that the two sections were intPndPd to bendit
the clients of investment advisers, and, in the case of § 215,
the parties to advisory contracts as well. As WP have previously recognizt>d. ~ 206 establishes "federal fiduciary standards" to govern the conduct of iuvestment advisers. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U. R., at 471. n. 11; Burks, .. Lasker,
U. S. - . - , n. 10; SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Burea'u, Inc., 37.1 F. S. 180, HH-192. Indeed. the Act's legislative history leaves no doubt that Congn'ss intended to
. impose enforceabk fiduciary obligations. See H. R. Rep. No.
2639, 76th C'ong., 3d Ress .. 28 (Hl40); S. Rep. Xo. 177.5. 7Gth
Cong .. 3d Sess .. 21 (H)40); SEC. Report on Investment Trusts
and Investment Compauies (Investnwnt Counsel and Iuvcstment Advisory Services). H. R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong .. 2d
Sess., 27-30 ( 1939). But whether Congress intended additionally that these provisious would be enforced through private litigation is a different qurstiou.
On this question the l~islatiw history of the Act is ~n
tirely silentr-a state of affairs not surprising whe11 it is rememberrd that the Act. concededly does not explicitly provide any
private remedies whatevet·. See Cam1011 v. Fniversity of
U. S .. at - . But while tlH' absence of
Chicago, supra, anything in the legislative history that indicates an intention
to confer any private> right of action is hardly helpful to the
respondent, it does not automatically undermine his position. This Court has held that the failure of Congress
expressly to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available. Cannon v. University of Chicayo, U. S., at - .
Such an i11tent rnay appear implicitly in the language or
,;hall havr madl' or rugap:ed in tlH' perform<t11ee of any :suC'h l'Ont raC't, and
(2) as rc•gard~ t hP right~ of 1111~· per~un who, not bPinp; a part~· to Huch
conlraC't, :<hall ha\'C' :t<'quirPd an~· right then·under with actual knowledge
of the faet>" by rca~un ol' which tlw making or pcrformanec of such contract wa::; in violation of any such proviHwn ."
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structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its
enactment.
In the case of § 215, we conclude that the statutory Ian~
guage itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief
in a federal court. By declaring certain contracts void, § 215
by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of void~
ness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere. At the
very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforcement of au investment advisers contract. But the legal consequences of voidness are typically not so limited. 4 person
with the power to avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a
court to have the contract rescinded and to obta.in restitution
of consideration paid. See Deckert V. Independence Corp.,
311 U. S. 28f 289;-Williston, Contracts, 3d edition, § 1525;
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudeuce, 4th edition, §§ 881 and 1092.
And this Court has previously recognized that a comparable
provision, ~ 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U. S. C. § 77cc (b). confers a "right to rescind" a contract void
under the criteria of the statute. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U. S. 375, 388. Moreover, the federal courts in general have viewed such language as implying an equitable cause
of action for rescission or similar relief.
E. g., Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512. 514 (DCED Pa.
1946); see III Loss. Securities Regulation 1758-1759 (2d ed.
1961). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U. S. 723, 735.
For these reasons we conclude that when Congress dew red
in ~ 215 that certain c ontracts a;;-void, it intended that the
customary legal incidents of v idness would follow. including
the ava1 a 1 ity o a suit fo escission or for ~ injunction
against continued operation of the contract, afrtt'for restitution.8 Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals was

-

s One pos:sibility, of course, is that Congress intended that claims under

'
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correct in ruling that the respondent may maintain au action
on behalf of the Trust seeking to void the investment advisers
contract. 0
We view quite differently. however, the respondent's claims
for damages and other monetaryrelief under § 206. Unlike
§ 215, ~ 206~mpTy})roscril3es certain conduct. and does not in
terms create or alter any civil liabilities. If monetary liability
to a private plaintiff is to be found, it must read it into the
Act. Yet it is an elemental canon of statutory construction
that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it.
"When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode,
it includes the negative of any other mode." Botany Mills v.
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). See Amtrak, supra,
414 U. S., at 458; Securities Protection Investment Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 419; '1'. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U. S. 464. Congress expressly provided both judicial and
administrative means for enforcing compliance with § 206.
Fi~st. under § 217 wTIIrul violations of the Act are criminal
offenses, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring civil actions in
federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including,
of course, § 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by
§ 203 to impose various administrative sanctions on persons
who violate the Act, including § 206. In view of these express
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by § 206. it is
highly improbable that "Congress absentmindedly forgot to
mention an intended private action." Cannon v. University
of Ch·i cago,- U.S., a t - (PowELL, J., dissenting).
§ 215 would be rai~rd only in state court. But we dPcline to adopt 'such
an :11101nalouH ron~truetion Without ~ome indication that Congre~s in fact
wi~hed to remit the litigation of :1 ft>dcral right to the Htate court~.
0 Juri~dirtion of Huch Huits would exi~t under § 214 which, though
rcfprring in term~ only to "Huits iu ('<.juity to enjoin violation::;." would
equally ~u:;tain action:s where ;:;imp!<' declaratory rt'lief or re:;ci1:ision il!'
sought.

/1

~()P1NION,
~SA:\lERICA

.

MORTGAGE ADVISOHS v. LEWIS

~

c.

:Even s ttlecJ rules of stlliutory construction ~mld yield, of
.t:oursc, to vidt>nce of a contrary legislative intent. Securities
Protection Investor Corp. v. Barbo·ur, 421 U. S. 412, 419;
Amtrak, supra, 414 lT. S., at 458. But what evideuce of intent
exists in this case, circumstantial though it be, weighs against
the implication of a private right of action for a monetary
award in a case such as this. Under each of the securities
1aws that preceded the Act here in question, and under the
Investnwnt Company Act which was enacted as companion
legislation, Congress expressly authorized private suits for
damages in prescribed circumstauccs. 1 ° For example, Congress provided an express damage remedy for misrepresen tations contained in an underwriter's registration statement in
§ 11 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, aud for certain mate~
rially misleading statements in § 18 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "Obviously, then, when Congress wished
to provide a private damage remedy, it kuew how to do so
and did so expressly." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, U. S., at 11. Blue Ch·ip Stamps v. Manor Druy Stores, 421
U. S., at 734 (1975); see Amtrak, supra, 414 U. S., at 458;
T. I. M. E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S., at 471. The fact
that it euacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here
at issue strongly suggests that Congress was simply unwilling
to impose any potential monetary liability to a p~te suitor.
(Gurfein, J.,
See Abrahamson v. Flechsner, 508 F. 2d, a.t dissenting).
The omission of any such potential remedy from the Act's
substa11tive provisions was paralleled in the j urisclictioual sec10 SeP Secmities Aet of 1933, §§ 11 and 12, 15 lJ. S. C. §§ 77k and 771;
RccuritiPR ExchangP Act or 19:34, §§ 9 (p), 16 (b), and 18, 15 U. S. C .
.'~ 71i (<'), 78p (b), and 78r ; Publie Utility Holding Company Act or
19:35, §§ 16 (u) alH.l 17 (b), 15 lT. S . C. §§ 79p (a) and 79q (b); Tru::~t
lndPnture Art of 19:39, § 3:23 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 77www (a) ; InvcRtment
Company Act of 1\140, § 30 (f), 15 U. S. C . § HOa-29 (f) .
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tion, ~ 214.]1 Early drafts of the bill had simply incorporated
by reference a provision of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935. which gave the federal courts jurisdiction "of all
suits in equity and ad·ious at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by" the statute (emphasis added).
SeeS. 3580. 76th Cong., 3d Sess .. 98 (introduced by Sen. Wagner, Mar. 14, 1940); H. R 8935, 76th Cong .. 3d Sess., 98 (introduced by Rep. Lea, Mar. 14, 1940). After hearings on the
bill in the Senate. representatives of the iuvcstment advisers
industry and the staff of the Commission met to discuss the
bill, and certain changes were made. The language that was
enacted as ~ 214 first appeared in this compromise versiou of
the bill. See Confidential Committee PriiJt, A. 3580, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess., § 213. That version, and the version finally
enacted into law, S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 214, both
omitted any references to "actions at law" or to "liability." 12
Sc·ction 214, 15 U. S. r. § 80b-H, vroviue:> :
"§ SOb-14. Jurisdiction of offen,:e" all([ l"llit:;.
11

"The di,.;triet courts of the Unit<'d Statr>< and the United Statet-~ t•ourts
of nn~· Trrritor~· or other j)lace subjPct to the jurisdic·tion of the United
State:; :;hall have juri~didion of violatiou:< of thi" :,;ubchaptrr or the rule~,
regulation", or orders tht·r·<·tmder, and, concurrently with State and Territorial courtR, of all ::;uit,.; in equit~· to pnjoin ;my violatiou of thi:< ::;ubchapt('f or the rules, n•gulations, or order::; tlwretmder. An~' criminal
11roceeding may be brought in the di,-t rict wherein any art or lran::;aetion
ron~tituting thr violation o<·currPd . Any suit or action to enjoin ally
violation of this ~ubchapkr or rules. regulation~, or order;.; thrreunder,
may be brought in any Httrh di:,;tri!'t or i11 th<• district whPrPin tlw defendant is an inhabitant or tran~aet,; busine:;~, nnd JH'O<'P::;,; in such ca:;c:;
may hP served in :tn~ · district of which thP clefPndant i~ an inhabitant or
transact:< bu::;inPSH or whPn·ver the d!'femlant may be found. .Judgments
and dpcree::< ~o rell(]PrPd shall bt• ::;ub.i<•rt to review as provided in ;.;ections
225 nnd :~47 of Titk• 2k. and s<•rtion 7, a:; anH:•nd<•d, of the Act entitled
'An A('t to e:;tablish a court of appeal:; for the District of Columbia,'
approvNl FPbnrary 9, lk9:3. Ko ('O~ts ,;hall be m;:;p~:;ecl for or again~l
the Conuui,-,:ion iu an~· JH'O<·<·ecling under thi:; subchapter brought by or
against the Commi::;;.;ion in any court.''
12 The n·~pondenL argue::; that thP omission of any reference in § 214:.
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The unexplained deletion of a single phrase from a j urisdictional provision is, of course, not determinative of whether a
private remedy exists. But it is one more piece of evideiiCe
that Congress did not intend to authorize a cause of action
for anything beyond limited equitable relief. 1 3
Relying on the factors identified ill Cort v. Ash, supra, the
respondent and the Commission, as amicus curiae, argue that
our inquiry in this case cannot stop with the intent of Congress, but must consider the utility of a private remedy, and
to "action:, at law" i~ without rclevanc·c Ul'rau,;c juri:,;diction over Hueh
ra;:<'~ aR thi:-: would often Pxi~t under 28 lf. S. C. § 1:~31. the gmeral
fedNal-qup,.:tion juri:-:diC't ion ,.:t atute, and iJl'<'aUO>l\ there wa,.; no cxprc~s
statrmcnt that thr omi,.::;iun wn;; intendt•d to precludr private remedir::L
But the rr::;pondent conecde:-: that thr languagl' of § 214 wa:-: probably
narrowe<l in view of the ab:.;ent'<' from thl' Advi"er:; Ad of any r:oxpre:;:;
pruvi:sion for a private cau:-:t• of artion for damagl'"· We agree, but find
thP omi:;,.ion inconsi:;trnt n10I'<' generally with an intent 011 the part of
Congres::; to makP sueh a remcd~r available.
13 Congn•H;; amPndpd thP Inw:;tmcnt Company Al't in 1970 to create
[1. narrowly circurmcrilwd right of action for damage~ ugain:;t investment
nuvi::;rrs to reg:Rtered inve,;tment. companies. Act of Dee. 14, 1970, Pub.
L. 91-5-l-7, 20, 84 Stat. 1·!2., 15 U.S. C. § HOa-35 (b). WhilP :sub~equPnt
h·gii'lation ran disclose little or nothing of the intrnt. of Congress in
enacting earlier law~. ~<·e SEC \'. Capital Gain~> H,esearch Bureau. supra,
375 U. S., at 199-200, the 1970 amendnwnts to thr companion Act is
another <"lrar indicaticn that. Cougres::; knew how to confer u private right
of nrtion wlwn it wished to do ~o.
In 1975 t hr Commi,;sion submit ted n propo:;al to CongrP~i:i that would
have anwmled § 214 to extPnd juri:;dietiou, without rc•gard to the amouut
in controvpr~~~ , to "act ions at law" under the Aet. SP<' S. 2849, 94th
Cong .. 2d Rr;.;s., § G (1976). 'Thl' Conuui:-;;.;ion was of the view that the
ameudmcnt abo would eonfirm the exi::;teiWl' of a privatP right of action
to <'!Ifon'€ the Act '::; ~ub:-;tantiw provisions. See Hearing:; on S. 2849
before thr SubcommittrP on SPeuritie~ of the Senate Conunittec on Bankmg, Hou.,ing, and ·orba11 Affair:;, 94th Cong., 2 SPH:-i., 17; Hearings on
H. R . 12981 and H. R. 137a7 beforl' the Subcornmittee on Con:;umpr
Protection and Finarwc of the Hou~e Conuuittce 011 lnt<•r:;tatc and Foreign
CommerC'r, 9-J.th Cong., 2d SPS::'. , ;~(i-37. Tlw Senate CommitteP reported·
favorably on the provi:-:ion a:; propo~ed by lhr Conum:;,;ion, but the bill
(ljd 110t eonw to. tt vote iu <'~ther House,_
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the fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated~ state
law. We re.ifcted thr sanw contentions last Term in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, where it was argued that these
factors standing alonr .i ustified the implication of a private
right of action under ~ 17 (a) of the Securities Excha11ge Act
of 1934. We said in that case:
11

lt is truP that in Cort v. Ash, :,·upra, the Court set forth
four factors that it considered "relevaBt" in determining
whether a private remedy is implicit i11 a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not decide
that each of these factors is eBtitled to equal weight. The
central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to
create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause
of action. Indeed, the first three factors discussed in
Cort-the language and focus of the statute, its legislative
history, and its purpose, see 422 U. S .. at 78-are ones
traditionally relied upon in determining legislative in•
tent." - - U. S., at - , - .

The statute in Touche Ross by its tenns neither granted
private rights to the members of any identifiable class, 11or
proscribed any conduct as unlawful. Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, supra, at - . In those circumstances it was
evident to the Court that no private remedy was available.
Section 206 of the Act here involved concededly was intended
to protect the victims of the fraudulent practices it prohibited.
But the mere fact that the statute was designed to protect
advisers' clients does not requirr the implication of a private
cause of action for damages 011 their behalf. 'J'ouche Ross &
Co. v. Redingto11, supra, 4421T. S .. a t - ; Cannon v. Univers·ity of Chicago, supra, at - ; Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Barbour, S'Upra, at 421. The dispositive question remains whether Congress intended to create any such remedy.
Having a11swered that question in the negative, our inquiry
is at an end.
For the reasons staU>d in this opinion, we hold that there·

-
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exists a limited private remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void au investment advisers contract
and restore the parties to the status quo, but that the Act
confprs no other pri \'ate causes of action, legal or equitable.
Accordingly. the judgment of the Court of APJ)eals is affirmed
in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to that
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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Dear Potter,
In due course, I shall circulate a
dissent in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice. Stewart
Copies to the Conference
erne

Potter:
You have written a fine opinion, and I expect
join it.
I do have, however, a question or two. At the
bottom of page 7, in what in effect is a "holding• sentence,
the opinion states that S215 authorizes a suit for
"rescission or for an injunction against continued operation
of the contract, and for restitution". I take this to mean
that the contract with an investment adviser would be voided
and that at least all fees paid to the adviser would be
restored.
But the term "restitution" could be read as meaning
considerably more.
Do you think the term, for example, could be r··~·?~iJ
construed to entitle an investor to recover the full amount ~;·~;'~ :.
of capital Placed in the hands (or at the disposal of) the
advisor to invest? If this view were taken, an investor who
had lost 50% of his original capital in reliance upon the
.
adviser's advice, would be entitled to recover the oriqinal ~~:~·,.;~t ''
100%. In effect, this would be a recovery of damages.
. . ~,! ~,:"ft ,
I have the same question with respect to the use
the term "status quo" on page 13 of the opinion.
Normally, an investor is not deemed to have
suffered any damages (i.e., any recoverable damages) if the
person entrusted with investment of capital conserves the

2.

~

principal. Investment advisers, bankers and brokers (indeed, • ~
even trustees) do not guarantee preservation of capital or
profits. If an investor had turned $100,000 over to an
adviser a month ago, and if the adviser had invested in
quality blue chips, there could have been a shrinkage in the
original capital of 15 to 25' - depending on which "chips•
were purchased. Of course, if the original capital were
stolen, of if fraud were practiced, rescission would include,
I suppose, recovery of the original capital.
If, however, there were only negligence, I would
assume that normally rescission - as an equitable remedy would not be available.
Respondents argue that equitable remedies may be
inferred under the Investment Advisors Act. These might be
indistinguishable from ordinary damages if rescission is
construed broadly to allow recovery for negligent as well as
fraudulent conduct. I am not sure, as you and I have
discussed, that even an action to recover monies lost through
fraud may be inferred.
Every complaint will aver fraud, and
thus - as a practical matter - unless rescission is defined
narrowly we may have opened the door widely to private suits.
situation.

In any event, shouldn't we try to clarify this

One minor point relates to the first sentence
page 9. I would appreciate your considering changing
word •would" in the first line to "could", and adding
the word •evidence• in the second line the qualifying
•persuasive". I would think that settled rules of
construction would not yield unless there were rather
conclusive evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
I would prefer not to cite Borak at all. An
anomaly when decided, and in light of more recent cases
{especially Touche, Ross, and vour opinion in this case), I
view Borak as a *dead cock in the pit•.
As I believe my dissenting opinion in Cannon is the
most detailed documentation of the extent to which
Congress has failed to be explicit as to the right to sue, ~
and the tendency (if not eagerness) of federal courts to
imply causes of action, I may add a one sentence concurring
opinion substantially as follows:
singl~
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"As I view the Court's opinion to be compatible with
my dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicaqo,
u.s., at
(ante, at 8, 9), I ioin the Court•s--opinion.·--- ---Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
lfp/ss
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